Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court by Cordray, Margaret Meriwether & Cordray, Richard
08_CORDRAY FINAL 11/30/2008 6:09:41 PM 
 
313 
Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding to Review 
High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court 
Margaret Meriwether Cordray* 
Richard Cordray** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every year, the United States Supreme Court decides a small handful 
of high-profile cases that tend to define the Court’s Term, and also 
disproportionately shape its perceived role in American life.  These 
cases, which may present critical struggles over the distribution of 
political power, as well as socially divisive issues such as religious 
freedom, free speech, property rights, abortion, and civil rights, not only 
determine how the public views the Court, but can also frame the broader 
cultural debate by pushing these issues to the forefront of political 
discourse. 
The Court’s decisions on whether and when to review these more 
politically charged cases thus have significant ramifications for the Court 
and for the country’s social agenda.  When the Court decides to hear a 
case involving gay rights, for example, the Court immediately raises the 
salience of that issue, and potentially places it in the center of the 
political debate.  Quite apart from the Court’s eventual resolution of that 
particular case on its merits, the very determination to hear oral argument 
and decide the case stands as an influential landmark in its own right. 
In this Article, we consider whether the Justices act differently in 
deciding to grant these high-profile cases than they do in more ordinary 
cases.  In reviewing petitions for certiorari, the Justices undoubtedly 
recognize that certain types of cases present more ideologically charged 
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and politically important issues.  In choosing to pass over or take up 
candidates from this subset of cases, the question is whether the Justices 
exhibit the same kind of behavior that they do in their standard case 
selection processes, or whether their decisional calculus at the certiorari 
stage is fundamentally different, and more strategic. 
Answering this question is not easy because case selection decisions 
are shrouded in secrecy, and they are dependent on a wide array of 
considerations for each individual Justice.1  Given the inherent 
complexity of each Justice’s own decisionmaking formula, it is difficult 
to gauge the full extent to which the politically or socially divisive nature 
of a case may influence him or her.  Nonetheless, the Justices’ voting 
records on certiorari, which can be found in the papers of retired Justices, 
provide a window into how the Justices individually, and the Court as a 
whole, behave in approaching these landmark cases. 
In this Article, we use information on the Justices’ certiorari votes 
that we gathered from the private papers of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, 
and Marshall to compare the Justices’ voting patterns on certiorari in the 
high-profile cases to their voting patterns in low-profile cases over the 
1983 through 1993 Terms.2  Our study reveals strong evidence that the 
Justices behave even more strategically in voting to grant high-profile 
cases than they do generally.  However, the data also suggests that the 
Justices are voting to grant at least some high-profile cases not because 
they believe they can win them, but for other reasons, such as their sense 
of the Court’s institutional responsibility to address such cases. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S CASE SELECTION PROCESS 
A. The Significance of the Decision to Decide 
As the Supreme Court decides which cases it will hear, it sets “the 
direction of constitutional law.”3  Indeed, not only deciding to decide a 
case, but also “[d]eciding not to decide is . . . among the most important 
things done by the Supreme Court.”4  The Court’s power to choose its 
                                                          
 1. See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of 
Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
389, 397–451 (2004) [hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari] (discussing the 
secrecy of the certiorari process and the factors that influence decisionmaking at the certiorari stage). 
 2. Raw data on file with authors. 
 3. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 294 (2005) 
(“[A]genda setting accounts for the direction of constitutional law, just as the opinions themselves 
account for its substance.”). 
 4. Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference (September 8, 
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cases allows it to shape the contours of its own agenda, and often to set 
the agenda for the country’s political and cultural debate as well.5  
Particularly with respect to cases presenting socially divisive issues, the 
Court’s very decision to grant review “increase[s] the political salience 
of the issues decided—regardless of which way the Court decides the 
issues.”6 
Moreover, the Justices’ decisions about whether and when to take up 
hot button issues affect the institutional and moral authority of the Court 
itself.7  While the general public has very little sense of the overall 
composition of the Court’s docket or the details of its rulings, the Court’s 
decisions to take up high-profile cases—those involving abortion, 
speech, religious freedoms, affirmative action, property rights, and other 
volatile issues—receive intense media attention.  As a result, the Court’s 
choices with respect to these high-profile cases “largely determine[] the 
image that the American people have of their Supreme Court.”8 
                                                                                                                       
1978), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND 
REMINISCENCES 177 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001).  Justice Brennan argued that decisionmaking at 
the threshold stage may be “second to none in importance.”  William J. Brennan, Jr., The National 
Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 477 (1973) [hereinafter Brennan, 
Another Dissent].  See also JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT 128 (1960) (contending 
that this “ability to control, to a great extent, both the volume and substance of the litigation which 
comes before it” is “the most striking attribute of the modern Supreme Court”); Jan Palmer, An 
Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 387 
(1982) (noting that “[m]uch of the Court’s power rests on its ability to select some issues for 
adjudication while avoiding others”). 
 5. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1737 (2000) (opining that in some respects “the 
Supreme Court’s power to set its agenda may be more important than what the Court decides on the 
merits”).  The decision not to decide is also important.  See Fowler V. Harper & Arnold Leibowitz, 
What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952 Term, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 427, 457 (1954) 
(“[T]he work which the Supreme Court does not do is as important as the work which it does.”). 
 6. Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1738.  The Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), for example, ignited a debate over gay rights and same-sex marriage. 
 7. See, e.g., H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 253–58 (1991) (discussing the Court’s willingness to take some cases of 
great societal importance, and its efforts to duck others); Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as 
History: An Interpretation, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 
5 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) (describing how the Court denied certiorari on “entirely specious 
grounds” in Naim v. Naim to avoid hearing a challenge to Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage in 
the tension-filled aftermath of Brown). 
 8. Brennan, Another Dissent, supra note 4, at 483.  Moreover, the decision to review a 
particular case can have significant ramifications.  The specific facts of the case may influence the 
scope, content, and even the outcome of the Court’s opinion on the merits.  See PERRY, supra note 7, 
at 265 (describing the importance to the Justices of finding a “good vehicle” to develop a doctrine in 
the preferred direction, and their recognition that a case with “bad” facts might cause one to “lose on 
the merits; or even if one won, . . . [to] take doctrine in a way that was undesirable”).  The timing of 
the decision to grant can also be critically important, given that delay may allow for a change in the 
personnel on the Court, the political climate, or the landscape of precedents.  See DENNIS J. 
HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 408 (1998) (quoting Justice White as 
saying, “it’s perfectly obvious from time to time that a case is being decided in a way quite different 
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Much is thus at stake for the Court and for the country at this 
“preliminary” stage.  Yet relatively little is known about how the Justices 
make their case selection decisions, and almost nothing is known about 
how they handle high-profile cases.9  Before embarking on a closer 
examination of the Justices’ certiorari behavior in high-profile cases, we 
briefly review case selection in general, discussing the Court’s processes 
and the factors that influence the Justices’ decisionmaking. 
B. Decisionmaking at the Certiorari Stage 
The central feature of decisionmaking at the certiorari stage is 
discretion.  Three key aspects of the Court’s case selection process 
combine to give the Justices virtually complete and unfettered discretion 
to control which cases they will hear on the merits.10 
First, the Court conducts case selection in secret, never publishing 
the Justices’ votes, never explaining the reasons why cases were denied, 
and only rarely indicating why cases were granted.11  Since votes and 
reasons are not published, no “certiorari precedent” is generated,12 which  
 
                                                                                                                       
than it would have been decided if his predecessor were still sitting there”); DORIS MARIE PROVINE, 
CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 70 (1980) (describing Chief Justice 
Warren’s concern that “‘[d]enials can and do have a significant impact on the ordering of 
constitutional and legal priorities.  Many potential and important developments in the law have been 
frustrated, at least temporarily, by a denial of certiorari.’”); Joan Biskupic, Roberts Steers Court 
Right Back to Reagan, USA TODAY, June 29, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington 
/2007-06-28-supreme-court-right_N.htm (quoting Justice Breyer who, in reading his dissent from the 
bench in the 2007 school race cases, said “[i]t is not often in the law that so few have so quickly 
changed so much”). 
 9. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 294–95 (“One would think legal scholars, quick to say how 
judges should decide cases, would have more to say about which cases they should decide in the first 
place. . . . But for the most part, normative scholars dwell on the cases the Court does hear and 
entirely neglect how the agenda itself is set.”); Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence, and 
Certiorari, 79 VA. L. REV. 717, 721–22 (1993) (reviewing H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: 
AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991)) (suggesting that, in light of 
“how significant the decision to decide is,” constitutional scholars should “be as interested in the 
processes by which the Justices decide not to engage in articulated decisionmaking as those by 
which they do”). 
 10. In rare instances, Congress mandates that the Court review certain cases.  See, e.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 1253 (2000) (appeals in civil injunctive actions from cases before three-judge district 
courts); 15 U.S.C. § 29(a) (2000) (appeals in a limited class of civil antitrust cases). 
 11. The background section of the Court’s opinion on the merits will sometimes briefly indicate 
why the Court accepted the case for review, but the Court almost never provides substantive reasons.  
See S. Sidney Ulmer, The Decision to Grant Certiorari as Indicator to Decision “On the Merits”, 4 
POLITY 429, 432 (1972) (describing a study that demonstrated the rarity with which the Court 
explained its reasons for granting or denying a case).  See generally Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1723–
25 (discussing the effects of secrecy). 
 12. See John M. Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 541, 556–57 (1958) 
(noting the lack of precedential constraint); Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1723 (same). 
08_CORDRAY FINAL 11/30/2008  6:09:41 PM 
2009] SETTING THE SOCIAL AGENDA 317 
relieves the Justices of any external accountability and gives them 
tremendous discretion in case selection.13 
Second, decisionmaking at this stage is highly atomistic, with very 
little discussion or interaction among the Justices.14  The Justices initially 
review the petitions for certiorari in chambers, and unless at least one 
Justice places the case on the “discuss list,” it is denied without any 
collective deliberation.15  In their regular conferences, the Justices as a 
group do consider the cases on the discuss list, but the norm is simply to 
vote on the cases without any real discussion of them.16  Because the 
Justices largely make their decisions at this stage in isolation, without 
having to supply reasons and justifications even to their colleagues,17 
there is less internal accountability as well, which further enhances the 
discretion that the Justices enjoy.18 
 
                                                          
 13. The Court has justified the secrecy of its process on the basis that the Justices do not have 
time to explain their decision in each of the thousands of petitions filed per Term, see William H. 
Rehnquist, Sunshine in the Third Branch, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 559, 561 (1977) (arguing that “there is 
simply not the time available to formulate statements of reasons why review is denied”), and on the 
ground that it needs flexibility to wait for the right case, to allow issues to percolate in the lower 
courts, and to control the size of its docket.  See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, 
Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1119 (1988) (“[E]ven once the 
Court decides that a certain issue is certworthy, it is under no obligation to take the first case that 
presents it. . . . The Court’s institutional interest, rather than the interest of the parties, is the 
determining factor . . . .”). 
 14. See, e.g., PERRY,  supra note 7, at 147–49 (quoting Justices saying that there is virtually no 
interchamber discussion on certiorari petitions prior to conference); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. 
Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in the Supreme Court, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 827 
(1990) [hereinafter Caldeira & Wright, Discuss List] (noting that “the makeup of the discuss list is 
the summation of a series of individual calculations largely free of collective interaction”). 
 15. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 7, at 85–91 (describing the “discuss” list and the “dead” list); 
Caldeira & Wright, Discuss List, supra note 14, at 809–13 (same); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span 
of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1983) (same); Byron R. White, The Work of the 
Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. ST. B. J. 346, 349 (1982) (same).  The great 
majority of the approximately 7000 petitions filed each Term are disposed of this way. 
 16. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 149.  The lack of collective deliberation is presumably due to 
the intense time pressure that the Justices are under.  Chief Justice Hughes, for example, estimated 
that the Court could allot only three and a half minutes at conference to each of the relatively few 
cases placed on the discuss list.  See Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as 
Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 5, 14 (1949).  Professor Hart estimated that 
each Justice can spend only about twenty minutes in total on each nonfrivolous petition, including 
all the time needed to read and become familiar with the case materials.  See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 87–88 (1959).  These time estimates undoubtedly 
would be shorter today. 
 17. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 163 (finding that the certiorari process is “relatively atomistic 
with decisions being made within chambers and the outcome on cert. being primarily the sum of 
nine individual decision processes”). 
 18. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 542 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (acknowledging 
that “neither those outside of the Court, nor on many occasions those inside of it, know just what 
reasons led six Justices to withhold consent to a certiorari”). 
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Third, the Justices themselves wrote the guidelines for considering 
certiorari petitions, and they provided for complete discretion.  The 
Court’s Rule 10 sets out the considerations that the Court takes into 
account in case selection, which are (in the main) whether the case 
presents an important federal question and whether there is a conflict in 
the lower courts.19  The rule emphasizes, however, that review “is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion,” and that the criteria provided 
are “neither controlling nor fully measuring [of] the Court’s 
discretion.”20 
With this unfettered discretion, the Justices are free to select cases on 
any basis, constrained “solely by their individual subjective notions of 
what is important or appropriate for review by the Court.”21  
Nevertheless, at least in the general run of cases, certain factors play a 
significant and predictable role.  Many of the petitions filed are frivolous 
and are disposed of easily; indeed, Justices have estimated that this is 
true in about seventy percent of cases.22 
                                                          
 19. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a)–(c).  The full text of the rule states: 
  Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.  A 
petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.  The 
following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, 
indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers: 
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of 
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has decided an 
important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last 
resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, 
or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s 
supervisory power; 
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that 
conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States court 
of appeals; 
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of 
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an 
important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. 
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of 
erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law. 
 20. See SUP. CT. R. 10; see also PERRY, supra note 7, at 221 (“Fundamentally, the definition of 
“certworthy” is tautological; a case is certworthy because four [J]ustices say it is certworthy.”); 
Levinson, supra note 9, at 736 (“[I]t seems difficult indeed to read the Court’s own Rule 10 as 
anything other than an invitation to balancing, to the making of ‘political choice(s)’ about what is 
‘important’ enough.”). 
 21. Eugene Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A. J. 253, 255 
(1973); see also WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939–1975, at 175–76 (1980) (stating 
that “the job here [deciding whether to grant plenary review] is so highly personal, depending on the 
judgment, discretion, and experience and point of view of each of the nine of us”); WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 265 (1987) (“Whether or not to vote to 
grant certiorari strikes me as a rather subjective decision, made up in part of intuition and in part of 
legal judgment.”). 
 22. See Brennan, Another Dissent, supra note 4, at 479 (noting that “the Court is unanimously 
 
08_CORDRAY FINAL 11/30/2008  6:09:41 PM 
2009] SETTING THE SOCIAL AGENDA 319 
In the remaining group of cases—the potentially meritorious cases—
three indicators of “importance” (the key criteria in the Court’s Rule 10) 
figure large.  First, if a genuine conflict exists between the lower courts 
or between the lower court and a Supreme Court precedent, the 
likelihood that the Court will grant review increases markedly.23  Second, 
if the federal government seeks review, asserting that it is adversely 
affected by a lower court decision or by the need to respond to 
conflicting decisions in different regions of the country, the Court is far 
more likely to grant the case.24  Third, if amicus curiae briefs are filed in 
support of (or even in opposition to) the petition for review, the 
probability that the Court will grant review increases dramatically, 
presumably because amicus briefs signal the Justices that the case has 
broader social or economic significance.25 
                                                                                                                       
of the view in 70 percent of all docketed cases, that the questions sought to be reviewed do not even 
merit conference discussion”); White, supra note 15, at 349 (“About 70 percent of the cases filed do 
not make the discuss list and are unanimously denied.”). 
 23. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1120 (1988) [hereinafter Caldeira & Wright, 
Organized Interests] (“Whenever actual conflict was present, the likelihood that certiorari was 
granted jumped dramatically.”); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law 
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 981–83 (2007) (reviewing TODD C. PEPPERS, 
COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW 
CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS 
OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006)) (showing that approximately 
70% of cases granted in the 2003–2005 Terms involved a conflict among the lower courts); S. 
Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 901, 906–11 (1984) [hereinafter Ulmer, Conflict as Predictive Variable] 
(demonstrating a significant relationship between the grant of certiorari and the presence of genuine 
intercircuit conflict or conflict with Supreme Court precedent); S. Sidney Ulmer, Conflict with 
Supreme Court Precedents and the Granting of Plenary Review, 45 J. POL. 474, 474–77 (1983) 
(finding that the Court is more likely to grant review in cases where the ruling conflicted with 
Supreme Court precedent). 
 24. The Court grants more than fifty percent of the Solicitor General’s petitions for review, 
whereas it grants only about three percent of paid petitions filed by other parties. See ROBERT L. 
STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 164 & n.6 (7th ed. 1993) [hereinafter STERN & 
GRESSMAN]; see also REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 
25 (1992) (between 1959 and 1989, the Solicitor General was successful in obtaining plenary review 
69.78% of the time, whereas private litigants were successful only 4.9% of the time); Caldeira & 
Wright, Discuss List, supra note 14, at 828 (finding that the presence of the United States as 
petitioner is a key determinant in the decisional calculus). 
The federal government’s success is also attributable to the Solicitor General’s restraint in 
seeking review, and to the expertise and quality of the lawyers in his office.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 142 (1996) (describing the Solicitor 
General’s office as “superbly staffed”); STERN & GRESSMAN, supra, at 164 (Solicitor General’s 
success “is due both to the fact that government cases are likely to be of more general public 
importance and to the strictness with which the office screens the cases lost by the government 
below before deciding to petition for certiorari.”). 
 25. See Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 23, at 1111–12.  Based on data 
from the 1982 Term, the authors showed that when a case involves an actual conflict or when the 
United States is the petitioner, the filing of just one amicus brief in support of the petition increases 
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The Justices’ individual views on other, more jurisprudential 
considerations also influence and guide their decisions on which cases 
present an “important” question.  Thus, for example, a Justice’s views on 
whether the Court should serve as an engine of social change will 
influence how eagerly (or hesitantly) that Justice reaches out for 
culturally or politically sensitive cases.26  Similarly, a Justice’s views on 
the importance of achieving uniformity in federal law will affect his or 
her inclination to vote to grant cases on that basis.27  Many other factors, 
such as his or her views on how the Court can best supervise the lower 
courts through precedent,28 special interest in a particular area of the 
law,29 concern about the size of the docket,30 and sense about whether the 
                                                                                                                       
the likelihood that the Court will grant certiorari by forty to fifty percent, and the filing of two or 
three amicus briefs increases the likelihood even more.  See id. at 1119, 1122.  Amicus briefs help to 
flag importance because they are expensive to prepare ($15,000 to $20,000 in 1988 and undoubtedly 
more today).  See id. at 1112. 
 26. Justice Brennan, for example, felt strongly that the Court should promote social change.  
See, e.g., KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS 
THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 164 (1993) (Justice Brennan took “an active leadership role in trying 
to find cases that would promote his reforms.”).  Justice Harlan, on the other hand, believed that the 
Court had no such mandate.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624–25 (1964) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (“The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should 
this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements.”).  
See generally Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 435–41 (discussing this 
variable in more detail). 
 27. While all of the Justices agree that resolving conflicts among the lower courts is an 
important function of the Court, see, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984) (noting that “the most commonly enunciated reason for granting review 
in a case is the need to resolve conflicts”), there is wide divergence in the Justices’ views on how 
much emphasis to give this variable.  Justice White, for example, fervently argued that a principal 
task of the Court is “to provide some degree of coherence and uniformity in federal law throughout 
the land,” White, supra note 15, at 349, whereas Justice Stevens saw no need for the Court to “‘act 
to eradicate disuniformity as soon as it appears.’”  California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400 n.11 
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory 
of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 716 (1984)).  
See generally Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 441–49 (discussing this 
variable in more detail). 
 28. See Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 441–51 (discussing how 
a Justice’s view of the proper mode of decisionmaking can influence his or her decisions about case 
selection). 
 29. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 262–63 (describing various interest areas for different Justices); 
Arthur D. Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary Inquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 947, 1048–49 (1985) (opining that up to half of the plenary docket is shaped by the particular 
interests and inclinations of the Justices then sitting on the Court). 
 30. See PROVINE, supra note 8, at 120 (concluding that the bulk of Justices during the Burton 
era “failed to vote often for review less because they were satisfied with lower-court results than 
because they felt constrained by the limited capacity of the Court for judicial decision making”); 
William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230, 231 
(1983) [hereinafter Brennan, Thoughts on Workload] (“There is a limit to human endurance, and 
with the ever increasing complexity of many of the cases that the Court is reviewing in this modern 
day, the number 150 taxes that endurance to its limits.”). 
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case presents a “good vehicle” for resolving the issue31 can also affect a 
Justice’s case selection decisions. 
Ideological and strategic considerations also play a role in 
decisionmaking on certiorari, at least in some cases.  A Justice is more 
likely to vote to grant a case when he or she seeks to reverse the lower 
court.32  In many instances, the Justices’ own ideological preferences 
surely influence their views on whether a case was rightly or wrongly 
decided, making ideology a factor in the decisionmaking.33  Just as 
surely, however, in some instances (such as tax and patent law cases) a 
Justice’s inclination to reverse is based not on ideology, but rather on 
purely legal considerations, leaving unclear the extent to which ideology 
plays a role.34 
To varying degrees, the Justices also engage in a strategic voting 
calculation at the certiorari stage, looking beyond whether the case 
deserves full review to whether their views will prevail on the merits.35  
                                                          
 31. Various problems can prevent a case from being a good vehicle, ranging from potential 
jurisdictional problems to bad facts.  See PERRY, supra note 7, at 265 (describing the importance to 
the Justices of finding a “good vehicle” to develop a doctrine in the preferred direction). 
 32. See JAN PALMER, THE VINSON COURT ERA: THE SUPREME COURT’S CONFERENCE VOTES 
59–62 (1990) (finding a statistically significant relationship between voting to grant certiorari and 
ultimately voting to reverse for all Justices during the Vinson era); PROVINE, supra note 8, at 107–10 
(finding that all Justices during the Burton period were more likely to vote to reverse a case that they 
voted to review); Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic 
Decision-Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824, 
832 (1995) (finding “overwhelming evidence that [J]ustices are reversal minded in their certiorari 
votes”); Saul Brenner & John F. Krol, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme 
Court, 51 J. POL. 828, 833 (1989) (finding that, over seven terms of the Vinson, Warren, and Burger 
Courts, Justices who voted to reverse on the merits had a grant rate of 77.7%, whereas Justices who 
voted to affirm had a grant rate of 59.1%). 
 33. See Lawrence Baum, Case Selection and Decisionmaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 443, 454–56 (1993) (arguing that, at the Supreme Court level, where the result 
is often not dictated by precedent, a preference for error correction likely has a strong ideological 
component); John F. Krol & Saul Brenner, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States 
Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335, 335 n.1 (1990) (same); see also Virginia C. 
Armstrong & Charles A. Johnson, Certiorari Decisions by the Warren & Burger Courts: Is Cue 
Theory Time Bound?, 15 POLITY 141, 149 (1982) (finding that in civil liberties and economic cases, 
the conservative Burger Court “consistently accepted more petitions involving liberal lower court 
decisions than those involving conservative lower court decisions”); Caldeira & Wright, Organized 
Interests, supra note 23, at 1120 (finding a “clear tendency” by the Burger Court to select cases 
decided liberally below); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical 
Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 759, 769 (2001) (finding that the predominantly conservative Court 
from 1981–1987 was 5.5 times more likely to grant a case if the decision below was liberal). 
 34. See Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 542 (1998) (reviewing LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)) (noting that the Court regularly 
grants “cases that lack ideological or political import” and suggesting that this demonstrates “the 
power of legal concerns”). 
 35. See Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme 
Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 561–71 (1999) [hereinafter Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting] 
(contending that strategic voting is routine and substantially impacts the Court’s docket); see also 
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Perhaps the most common forms of strategic voting are the “defensive 
denial,” where a Justice votes against his or her own preference to grant a 
case in order to fend off an undesirable result on the merits, and the 
“aggressive grant,” where a Justice votes to grant a case not to reverse, 
but rather to affirm and thus give the Supreme Court’s imprimatur to a 
desirable result below.36  Yet another strategic behavior is when a Justice 
seeks a “good vehicle”—a case with a good set of facts—in order to 
enhance his or her chances of driving doctrine in a particular way or 
convincing a swing Justice to join.37 
Although there is disagreement about whether the Justices engage in 
strategic voting, recent empirical studies provide strong evidence that 
they do,38 and the Justices themselves have acknowledged as much.39  
There is also growing attention to how effectively the Court may 
“signal” its interest in particular issues, and how this signaling may 
encourage other parties, including litigants, lower courts, and officials in 
the other branches and levels of government, to influence the legal and 
policy agenda on those issues.40  But the real (and yet unresolved) issue 
                                                                                                                       
Boucher & Segal, supra note 32, at 830–32, 836 (arguing that Justices who wish to affirm the 
decision below have less to gain and more to lose, so more carefully calculate the chances of 
winning on the merits than reverse-minded Justices); Saul Brenner, The New Certiorari Game, 41 J. 
POL. 649, 651–55 (1979) (same); Palmer, supra note 4, at 393–96 (finding a positive relationship 
between voting to grant certiorari and voting with the majority on the merits in a study of 512 cases 
from the 1947–1956 Terms). 
 36. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 80 (1998) 
(describing aggressive grants and defensive denials); PERRY, supra note 7, at 198–212 (same); 
Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting, supra note 35, at 558 (defining these terms and giving 
examples). 
 37. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 281–82 (discussing the importance Justices attach to finding a 
good vehicle). 
 38. See, e.g., Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting, supra note 35, at 553–71 (providing strong 
empirical evidence that strategic voting occurs regularly and substantially affects the composition of 
the Court’s plenary docket); Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States 
Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 405 (2002) (opining that, 
although the debate over whether the Justices vote strategically will continue, “the evidence, 
especially that offered by the most recent (and sophisticated) studies, tips the scales substantially in 
favor of the strategic camp”).  But cf. PROVINE, supra note 8, at 125–30, 172 (arguing that the 
Burton era Justices did not consider the likely result on the merits in case selection); Krol & Brenner, 
supra note 33, at 340–42 (doubting whether the Vinson Court, in general, considered likely outcome 
in case selection, but recognizing that individual Justices may have done so). 
 39. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 198–202 (describing how each of the five Justices he 
interviewed acknowledged—with varying degrees of approval—use of the defensive denial); 
Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 1, at nn.122–24 and accompanying text 
(discussing various Justices’ own observations on use of the defensive denial). 
 40. See, e.g., VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW JUSTICES AND 
LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA 4 (2007) (“The main argument is that the incentive to 
support litigation in particular policy areas varies over time in accordance with litigants’ changing 
perceptions of Supreme Court [J]ustices’ policy priorities.”).  See generally id. passim (discussing 
and documenting evidence to support this main argument). 
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is how rare or how pervasive ideological and strategic factors are in the 
individual Justices’ decisionmaking when voting on certiorari.41 
It would seem natural that the extent to which, and the situations in 
which, an individual Justice acts strategically are closely linked to how 
strongly he or she feels about the issue at stake.42  In other words, the 
more intensely a Justice cares about a particular issue or doctrine, the 
more likely it is that the ultimate resolution on the merits will matter to 
the Justice, causing that factor to play a larger role in his or her certiorari 
decisions in those cases. 
In the next section, we examine this assumption—that the Justices 
act more strategically in cases about which they feel strongly.  To do 
this, we identified the “high-profile” cases in each Term from the 1983 
Term through the 1993 Term.  In determining which cases belonged in 
the high-profile category, we used several sources.  First, we included 
every case designated as a “major decision” in the Guide to the U.S. 
Supreme Court and The Supreme Court Compendium.43  Second, for 
each Term, we evaluated all of the cases that either were included in the 
Harvard Law Review’s recap of the “leading cases” of the Term44 or 
were discussed in the New York Times’ summary of the Term.45  From 
this larger list of cases, we treated as “high-profile” those cases that 
involved issues of significant social or political controversy.  In 
particular, we included cases in all of the following categories: 
substantive due process/abortion; religion; free speech (political, libel, 
obscenity, free press); federalism; separation of powers; takings; race and 
                                                          
 41. Some scholars contend that use of such considerations is rare.  See, e.g., PROVINE, supra 
note 8, at 125–30, 172 (contending that the Burton era Justices did not act strategically in case 
selection).  Others contend that consideration of ideological and strategic considerations are matters 
of routine.  See, e.g., Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting, supra note 35, at 553–71 (opining that 
strategic voting occurs regularly).  We have argued that, while there is a significant merits-oriented 
component to the Justices’ decisionmaking, jurisprudential and administrative considerations play a 
substantial role as well.  See Margaret M. Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court 
Case Selection: The Relationship Between Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 16–30 
(2008) [hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Strategy in Case Selection]. 
 42. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 7, at 274–82 (arguing that where a Justice cares deeply about a 
particular issue, “the first thing that the [J]ustice does is try to make an assessment of whether or not 
he will win on the merits,” but in other cases, it is more typical to employ a variety of procedural 
“gatekeeping” criteria). 
 43. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 124–33 tbl.2-12 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM]; DAVID 
G. SAVAGE, 2 GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1239–47 (4th ed. 2004).  We were unable to 
locate any information on the Justices’ votes in one of these “major decisions,” Herrera v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 390 (1993), so it is not included in our dataset. 
 44. E.g., Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163 (1992). 
 45. E.g., Linda Greenhouse, A Divided Supreme Court Ends the Term with a Bang, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 1990, at E3. 
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sex discrimination; Eighth Amendment (sentencing, death penalty); 
Fourth Amendment (exclusionary rule); and Fifth/Sixth Amendment 
(Miranda).  Because there were so many cases in the death penalty and 
free speech areas that involved insignificant issues at the margins of 
those constitutional provisions, we eliminated cases from those 
categories that clearly appeared to present technical issues, rather than 
issues of social or political significance.46  Approximately fifteen cases 
per Term fell within the high-profile category (the totals ranged from a 
low of ten in the 1991 Term to a high of twenty in the 1988 Term); a list 
of these cases is provided in Appendix A, along with the votes cast by 
each of the Justices in all of those cases.47 
III. VOTING ON CERTIORARI IN HIGH-PROFILE CASES 
Each individual Justice has a complex and highly individualized 
process for culling out those special cases that warrant plenary review.  
Our question is whether, consciously or subconsciously, they treat high-
profile cases differently from the other cases in the select group of 
nonfrivolous certiorari petitions.  Although the Justices are relatively 
isolated from the daily concerns and struggles of most Americans, it 
seems certain that they not only are aware of which issues lie at the heart 
of the country’s social and political agenda, but have their own deeply 
held views about those issues.48  What we seek to assess, as far as the 
Justices’ voting records permit, is how the Justices approach the cases 
that present these issues. 
 
                                                          
 46. There are two potential problems with our selection of the high-profile cases.  First, the 
year end summaries from both the New York Times and Harvard Law Review are created after the 
cases have been decided, and the editors’ decisions on which cases to include are likely influenced 
by the results in those cases.  The Justices, of course, are looking at the cases much earlier, and their 
perceptions of which cases are high-profile at the certiorari stage may not line up exactly with which 
cases turn out to be high-profile cases at the end of the Term.  Second, eliminating cases based on 
whether they presented merely technical issues introduces an element of subjectivity into the 
creation of the comparison sets.  We felt it was essential, however, to make this additional cut in 
order to create a set of cases that met our definition.  We designated the set of high-profile cases 
before doing any of the empirical analysis to ensure that we did not manipulate the data in any way 
to achieve particular results. 
 47. Interestingly, although the size of the Court’s docket declined markedly in the 1990s, the 
number of cases that fell within the high-profile category each Term remained relatively steady.  The 
specific numbers are as follows: 1993—11; 1992—17; 1991—10; 1990—16; 1989—13; 1988—20; 
1987—18; 1986—11; 1985—18; 1984—13; 1983—14. 
 48. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 260 (noting that the Justices “do read the newspapers, and they 
do live in Washington, and they undoubtedly know when the resolution of an issue needs the 
imprimatur of the Supreme Court”); id. at 280 (recognizing that “those cases about which a [J]ustice 
would care strongly are often ones of great importance”). 
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One possibility is that the Justices behave even more strategically 
than usual in such cases to achieve the results that they desire.  Individual 
passions run high when issues such as abortion, religious freedom, gay 
rights, and affirmative action are involved.  With regard to such issues, 
each Justice generally has clearly formed views and a keen interest in 
seeing those views reflected in legal doctrine.49  Moreover, each Justice 
usually is able to develop a strong sense of the other Justices’ positions, 
and how the Court will likely resolve the case on the merits.50  There 
would thus seem to be strong temptation to vote based on the expected 
outcome, given the ideological stakes and the ease of casting a forward-
looking vote at the threshold stage. 
Based on his extensive interviews of five Justices and sixty-two 
former law clerks, Professor H. W. Perry concluded that the Justices do 
act differently and more strategically in ideologically laden, socially 
important cases.  Perry found that in most cases the Justices follow a 
“jurisprudential mode” of decisionmaking, where in essence they take 
each nonfrivolous petition through a series of gates, considering whether 
there is a conflict in the circuits, how important the issue is, how urgent 
resolution of the issue is, and whether the particular case is a good 
vehicle substantively and procedurally.51 
However, Perry contended that in those cases where a Justice cares 
deeply about a particular issue—as is almost invariably true in the high-
profile cases—he or she tends to employ a far more outcome-oriented 
decisional calculus: “When entering the outcome decision mode, the first 
thing that the [J]ustice does is try to make an assessment of whether or 
                                                          
 49. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States of America (Sept. 28, 1962), in 371 U.S. ix, x (1962) (“The 
nature of the issues which are involved in the legal controversies that are inevitable under our 
constitutional system does not warrant the nation to expect identity of views among the members of 
the Court regarding such issues, nor even agreement on the routes of thought by which decisions are 
reached.”); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., What Really Goes on at the Supreme Court, 66 A.B.A. J. 721, 722 
(1980) (“We do indeed have strong professional differences about many of our cases. . . . We fight 
hard for our professional views.”); William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 
A.B.A. J. 361, 363 (1973) (“When reasonable minds may and do frequently disagree as to the proper 
interpretation of a constitutional provision, there is a natural tendency on the part of a [J]ustice to 
want to state his own views if they differ significantly from those of the majority of his brethren.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Myths and Misperceptions About the Supreme Court, 48 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 6, 10 (1976) (“Of course, Justices differ in their perceptions of issues, in what is 
sometimes called their judicial philosophy, and in basic assumptions as to the meaning of some 
provisions of the Constitution.  On some of these issues, depending on the context, one may 
rationally guess as to how a brother [J]ustice will vote.”).  He went on to caution, however, that “on 
most of the closest issues advance predictions are hazardous, even for those of us who serve 
together.”  Id. 
 51. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 277–79 (discussing the Court’s decision process with a 
graphical representation). 
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not he will win on the merits.  If he thinks he will not, he will vote to 
deny the case.”52  If, on the other hand, “the [J]ustice thinks he will win 
on the merits, and if [the case] allows him to move doctrine in the way he 
wishes,” then the Justice will vote to grant.53  Professor Ulmer also has 
presented evidence that the Justices’ strategy depends on the content of 
the issue, with some cases merely requiring a legal resolution and others 
implicating concerns from a broader policy perspective.54 
A second possibility, however, is that the Justices act with a greater 
institutional sense of the Supreme Court’s role in the high-profile cases.55  
This possibility is almost diametrically opposed to the first: rather than 
voting strategically with a view to advancing their own social and 
political agendas, the core factor in the Justices’ decisionmaking is the 
importance of the case to the Supreme Court’s institutional standing and 
integrity.  Each individual Justice’s particular conception of the Supreme 
Court’s essential role and responsibilities is no doubt somewhat distinct 
and influenced by many factors.56  But the Justices nevertheless must 
                                                          
 52. Id. at 280.  Perry provided a caveat, however: 
The one mitigating situation in this outcome-driven behavior would be if it would be 
institutionally irresponsible not to take the case; for example, if the [Solicitor General] 
convinces [the Justice] that refusal to decide the issue now would be disastrous, or if it is 
a decision where the Supreme Court simply must act.  An example of the latter might be 
something like the Nixon tapes case. 
Id. 
 53. Id. at 265; see also id. at 275, 279–82 (describing the “outcome mode” decision model and 
noting that a Justice will flip over to this model whenever he or she cares strongly about an issue, 
whether the case involves a politically sensitive issue or a more mundane issue in an area that 
happens to matter deeply to that particular Justice).  Justices occasionally acknowledge using a 
similar approach on the merits.  See, e.g., Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Benjamin Cardozo (Jan. 19, 
1932) (on file in Harlan F. Stone Papers, Library of Congress) (“I have felt called upon to dissent so 
much in cases involving constitutional questions that I usually let private law decisions with which I 
do not agree pass without noting an objection.”), quoted in WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF 
JUDICIAL STRATEGY 62 n.* (1964). 
 54. See Ulmer, Conflict as Predictive Variable, supra note 23, at 901–11 (supporting the view 
that the Justices employ this dichotomous approach). 
 55. Chief Justice Roberts, for instance, has been an apostle for this approach in many of his 
public statements about the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE 
ATLANTIC 104, 106 (Jan./Feb. 2007), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200701/john-
roberts (“Instead of nine [J]ustices moving in nine separate directions, Roberts said, ‘it would be 
good to have a commitment on the part of the Court to acting as a Court, rather than being more 
concerned about the consistency and coherency of an individual judicial record.’”); id. at 113 (“In 
other words, Roberts said, judicial temperament involves a judge’s willingness to ‘factor in the 
Court’s institutional role,’ to suppress his or her ideological agenda in the interest of achieving 
consensus and stability.”). 
 56. This conception has been described by the Justices themselves as being highly subjective in 
its nature.  As Justice Harlan stated, whether a case is important enough to merit the Court’s plenary 
review “[f]requently . . . is more a matter of ‘feel’ than of precisely ascertainable rules.”  Harlan, 
supra note 12, at 549.  Likewise, Justice Douglas observed that these matters are “so highly 
personal, depending on the judgment, discretion, and experience and point of view of each of the 
nine of us.”  DOUGLAS, supra note 21, at 175–76.  See generally Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of 
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recognize the disproportional importance of these cases to the Court’s 
image with the American public and its authority within our tripartite 
system of government.57 
To the extent these considerations carry weight, they would tend to 
lead the Justices to vote non-strategically in the high-profile cases.  
Rather than asking whether he or she will win on the merits, the Justice 
instead would ask whether it is necessary and expected that the United 
States Supreme Court should decide this case or this issue at this time.  
Although the internal dynamics of the Justices’ conference are largely 
unknown, it is quite plausible that the importance of these high-profile 
cases to the Court as an institution may cause the Justices to spend more 
time in conference deliberating as a body over whether to grant or deny 
them.  This additional collective consideration as a Court, rather than the 
usual tallying of predetermined votes that were reached in relative 
isolation, might also lead to greater consensus about the need for 
Supreme Court review.58 
Professor Doris Marie Provine has championed the view that the 
Justices’ sense of judicial responsibility leads them to act non-
strategically in case-selection decisions.  Noting that the certiorari 
process allows the Justices virtually limitless discretion, she nonetheless 
argued that “members of the Supreme Court share a conception of their 
role which prevents them from using their votes simply to achieve policy 
preferences.”59  Based on her examination of Justice Burton’s papers, 
Provine found that the Justices’ voting records on certiorari indicated 
“that the [J]ustices selected cases with something more than the result 
they desired on the merits in mind.  More particularly, these voting 
patterns seem to reflect judicial sensitivity to the role of the Supreme 
                                                                                                                       
Certiorari, supra note 1, at 416–51 (discussing various factors that influence individual Justices’ 
views on the proper role of the Court and how they affect decisionmaking at the certiorari stage). 
 57. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 7, at 253–60 (discussing the Court’s willingness to take some 
cases of great societal importance, and its efforts to duck others); Brennan, Thoughts on Workload, 
supra note 30, at 235 (“The choice of issues for decision largely determines the image that the 
American people have of their Supreme Court.”); Hartnett, supra note 5, at 1738 (noting perhaps 
“the most significant impact of Supreme Court decisions is to increase the political salience of the 
issues decided—regardless of which way the Court decides the issues”). 
 58. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 55, at 110 (“Rehnquist was famous for running a briskly 
efficient conference, but Roberts said that his own vision of unanimity sometimes requires longer 
discussions.  ‘There’s a lot less flexibility once something is in writing,’ he said.”).  A generation 
before, Justice White had offered his own description of conference deliberations on the Burger 
Court as “straightforward affairs,” and whether “we are discussing certioraris or argued 
cases . . . [t]here is a good deal of give and take in the process, and by the time that everyone has had 
his say, the vote is usually quite clear,” though it is unclear how often the discussion may have 
fostered any greater consensus.  White, supra note 15, at 383. 
 59. PROVINE, supra note 8, at 174. 
08_CORDRAY FINAL 11/30/2008  6:09:41 PM 
328 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
Court on the merits.”60  While Provine’s analysis was not focused on 
high-profile cases, and while she recognized the possibility that “some 
[J]ustices calculate outcomes in cases that are particularly important to 
them,”61 she strongly advocated that “the [J]ustices’ perceptions of a 
judge’s role and of the Supreme Court’s role in our judicial system” are 
central to their case selection decisions.62  Professor Walter F. Murphy, 
in his classic study of judicial strategy, likewise observed: 
It would be . . . difficult to deny that much of the force of self-restraint 
can be traced to individual Justices’ concepts of their proper role in 
American government, to a realization that they are equipped by 
training, availability of information, and choice of legal remedies to 
offer only partial solutions to many problems and no solution at all to 
many others.63 
Yet a third possibility is that the Justices treat case selection in high-
profile cases in the same manner that they treat all other cases.  The 
Justices’ sense of the judicial role, as opposed to the institutional role of 
the Supreme Court, might lead them to apply the same standards through 
the same selection process in every case, whether the issue involves 
patent law, the tax code, abortion, or affirmative action.64  In other 
words, the Justices may use the same blend of strategic and institutional 
factors in high-profile cases as they do in more ordinary cases, rather 
than giving greater emphasis to strategic (or institutional) considerations.  
At a minimum, the Justices may feel an obligation to try to follow their 
usual procedures in these cases, which may affect their case selection 
decisions.65 
 
                                                          
 60. Id. at 124–25. 
 61. Id. at 129. 
 62. Id. at 6. 
 63. MURPHY, supra note 53, at 29. 
 64. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 7, at 3 (“Political scientists do often over-politicize the Court, 
disregarding many of the very real constraints upon it.”); C. Herman Pritchett, The Development of 
Judicial Research, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 42 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus 
eds., 1969) (“Judges make choices, but they are not the ‘free’ choices of congressmen. . . . Any 
accurate analysis of judicial behavior must have as a major purpose a full clarification of the unique 
limiting conditions under which judicial policy making proceeds.”). 
 65. See, e.g., BAIRD, supra note 40, at 83–120 (discussing the “time-lapsed” attention that the 
Supreme Court pays to prioritized policy areas and suggesting that the Justices’ concerns about the 
Court’s institutional legitimacy leads them to avoid issuing important policy-shifting decisions in the 
same substantive area in rapid succession).  In another passage, she suggests as an alternative that 
“[p]erhaps the conclusion to draw from this debate is that [J]ustices would like to have it both 
ways—to implement their policy preferences while trying to maintain their appearance of being 
constrained.”  Id. at 30. 
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To gain a better sense of how the Justices approach the cases that 
present high-profile issues, we collected information on the Justices’ 
certiorari votes from the private papers of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, 
and Marshall for the 1983 Term through the 1993 Term.  We used this 
information to make four types of comparisons between the Justices’ 
behavior in high-profile cases and their behavior in low-profile cases.66  
First, we compared the frequency with which each Justice voted to grant 
high-profile cases as opposed to low-profile cases.  Second, we 
compared the degree of unanimity (and divisiveness) with which the 
Court granted high-profile cases as opposed to low-profile cases.  Third, 
we looked at whether Justices who are ideologically aligned on the 
merits tend to vote together more frequently on certiorari in high-profile 
cases as opposed to the full set of cases granted (and, conversely, 
whether Justices who are ideologically opposed on the merits tend to 
vote together less frequently on certiorari in high-profile cases as 
opposed to the full set of cases granted).  Fourth, for five of the Terms in 
our dataset, we tracked how each Justice voted on certiorari and then on 
the merits, to assess whether the Justices behave more strategically in 
high-profile versus low-profile cases.  As we will explain further, we did 
so by considering whether each Justice tended to “win” more frequently 
in high-profile cases, and also whether each Justice tended to vote to 
reverse more frequently in such cases. 
In comparing the frequency with which each Justice voted to grant 
cases, the degree of unanimity in voting on certiorari, and the Justices’ 
voting alignments, we saw strong evidence that the Justices’ tendency to 
vote with an eye to the merits is even more pronounced in high-profile 
cases, but the results also suggested that the Justices are voting at least in 
some cases based on a sense of the Court’s institutional responsibility.  
In the five Terms for which we tracked the Justices’ voting behavior 
from certiorari through the merits, we found that in the cases the Justices 
voted to grant, they tended to vote to reverse with the same frequency in 
high-profile versus low-profile cases.  But the Justices tended to win less 
often in high-profile cases that they voted to grant than they did in low-
profile cases that they voted to grant.  Although the reasons for this 
voting behavior are not entirely clear, we think it provides some further 
evidence that the Justices’ sense of the Court’s institutional 
responsibilities has an effect on their decisionmaking in high-profile 
cases. 
                                                          
 66. For purposes of our analysis, we treated all cases that were granted for plenary review but 
were not high-profile cases as “low-profile” cases.  See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text 
(describing the method we used to identify the high-profile cases in each Term). 
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A. Grant Rate in High-Profile vs. Low-Profile Cases 
To determine the Justices’ grant rates (i.e., the frequency with which 
each Justice voted to grant certiorari), we calculated the grant rate for 
each Justice based on the percentage of votes that he or she cast to grant 
certiorari67 in the total universe of cases that were granted and set for 
plenary review on the merits.68 
To gauge the ideological preferences of the Justices, we used data 
from the Supreme Court Compendium on the percentage of civil liberties 
cases in which each Justice voted in a liberal direction.69  The Justices’ 
scores fell roughly into four categories: liberal (above 75%), moderate-
liberal (between 75% and 55%), moderate-conservative (between 55% 
and 35%), and conservative (below 35%).70  Not surprisingly, during the 
Terms that they participated in our dataset (1983–1993), Justices 
Marshall and Brennan fell in the liberal category; Justices Stevens, 
Blackmun, and Ginsburg fell in the moderate-liberal category; Justices 
Souter, Kennedy, Powell, and O’Connor fell in the moderate-
conservative category; and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, and 
Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist fell in the conservative category.71 
Based on the Justices’ grant rates in the full set of cases that the 
Court granted for plenary review, it appears that the Justices’ strategic 
                                                          
 67. We included all “Join-3” votes, because they function as votes to grant.  See generally 
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 737, 780–81 (2001) [hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Plenary Docket] (discussing 
Join-3 votes).  A Join-3 vote is a vote to grant review if at least three other Justices vote in favor of 
review.  See David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme 
Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 788–99 (1997) (describing the Justices’ use 
of the Join-3 vote). 
 68. We calculated each Justice’s grant rate for each Term, then averaged the per-Term numbers 
to arrive at an overall grant rate for each Justice. 
Because so many petitions are frivolous, and because all of the Justices simply vote to deny 
them, considering the Justices’ grant rates based on the percentage of votes cast in all cases filed 
would produce extremely low grant rates and a false sense of similarity among the Justices.  In 1983, 
for example, 4222 new cases were filed, and that number rose to 6897 in 1993.  See SUPREME 
COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 43, at 62 tbl.2-2.  During that period, no Justice voted to grant 
more  than 275 cases in a Term, and the great majority voted to grant fewer than 150. 
 69. THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM provides the percentage of cases in which each Justice 
took the liberal position in different issue areas each Term.  See id. at 490–523 tbl.6-3.  We used 
each Justice’s average score over the 1983–1993 terms in the civil liberties area, which includes the 
areas of criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorney issue 
areas.  The authors state that the term “liberal” is “most appropriate [in the civil liberties area], 
where it signifies pro-defendant votes in criminal procedure cases, pro-women or -minorities in civil 
rights cases, pro-individual against the government in First Amendment, due process, and privacy 
cases, and pro-attorney in attorneys’ fees and bar membership cases.”  Id. at 523. 
 70. These appear to be the cut-off points that the authors of THE SUPREME COURT 
COMPENDIUM used, though they lumped all moderates together in one large category.  See id. at 482. 
 71. See id. at 490–523 tbl.6-3. 
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concerns about whether they will win on the merits play a substantial 
role.72  In general, the more conservative Justices had higher grant rates 
than the more liberal Justices, over a period when the Court’s decisions 
on the merits tended in a conservative direction.73  But there were several 
exceptions to this general trend.  Three conservative Justices—Chief 
Justice Burger, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy (a moderate-
conservative)—ranked in the lower half of the full group.  Indeed, Chief 
Justice Burger was among only four Justices who voted to grant fewer 
than 60% of the cases.  Two of the moderate-liberal Justices—Justice 
Blackmun and Justice Ginsburg—were among the five Justices with 
grant rates over 70%.  (Our data on Justice Ginsburg, however, is only 
from her first Term on the Court, making it somewhat unreliable.)  The 
Justices and their grant rates, ranked from high to low, are listed in Table 
1 below.74 
 
Table 1: Grant Rates of Justices in All Cases Granted 
Justice Grant Rate  Justice Grant Rate 
BRW 89.9  LFP 64.1 
SOC 74.4  AMK 60.9 
RBG 73.9  AS 60.8 
WHR 70.3  WB 57.0 
CT 70.2  JPS 53.5 
HAB 70.1  TM 51.0 
DS 64.9  WJB 50.8 
 
We have argued elsewhere that, while merits-oriented concerns play 
a significant role in the Justices’ decisionmaking at the certiorari stage, 
the Justices’ decisions on certiorari are based on a complex and 
multidimensional set of considerations that also include administrative, 
                                                          
 72. This observation is consistent with the results reported in Caldeira et al., Sophisticated 
Voting, supra note 35, at 564–65 (finding that a conservative Justice’s probability of voting for 
certiorari increases when the Court is conservative and that a liberal Justice’s probability of voting 
for certiorari declines when the Court is conservative). 
 73. THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM tracks the proportion of cases decided in a liberal 
direction for each Term.  See SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 43, at 207–08, 231–35 
tbl.3-8.  In civil liberties cases, which include the areas of criminal procedure, civil rights, First 
Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorney issue areas, an average of 41.6% of cases were 
decided in a liberal direction from 1983 to 1993, the period of our sample.  See id. at 233–34 tbl.3-8. 
 74. The Justices are indicated by their initials: Byron R. White (BRW); Sandra Day O’Connor 
(SOC); Ruth Bader Ginsburg (RBG); William H. Rehnquist (WHR); Clarence Thomas (CT); Harry 
A. Blackmun (HAB); David Souter (DS); Lewis F. Powell (LFP); Anthony M. Kennedy (AMK); 
Antonin Scalia (AS); Warren Burger (WB); John Paul Stevens (JPS); Thurgood Marshall (TM); and 
William J. Brennan (WJB). 
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rule-based, and jurisprudential factors.75  The Justices’ overall grant rates 
in cases granted reflect the composite influence of these distinct 
considerations. 
In high-profile cases, however, the Justices’ grant rates correlated 
much more closely with their ideological inclinations.  Table 2, below, 
sets out the following data for each Justice: (1) grant rate in high-profile 
cases; (2) grant rate in low-profile cases; (3) the difference between these 
two grant rates; and (4) the percentage of civil liberties cases in which he 
or she voted in a liberal direction (with a label for which rough category 
he or she fell within). 
 
Table 2: Grant Rates of Justices in High-Profile and Low-Profile 










Liberal Voting in 
Civil Liberties 
Cases 
White 87.4% 90.1% -2.7 34.6% (C) 
O’Connor 77.5% 73.9% 3.6 35.8% (M-C) 
Thomas 76.6% 69.5% 7.1 26.6% (C) 
Rehnquist 76.2% 69.2% 7.0 22.9% (C) 
Burger 75.9% 55.2% 20.7 27.5% (C) 
Ginsburg 72.7% 74.1% -1.4 55.3% (M-L) 
Kennedy 71.4% 59.8% 11.6 38.0% (M-C) 
Scalia 68.0% 59.5% 8.5 30.1% (C) 
Souter 67.3% 64.5% 2.8 50.2% (M-C) 
Powell 66.9% 63.8% 3.1 36.1% (M-C) 
Blackmun 65.0% 70.7% -5.7 66.2% (M-L) 
Stevens 54.9% 53.4% 1.5 66.9% (M-L) 
Brennan 48.0% 51.2% -3.2 81.8% (L) 
Marshall 45.9% 51.6% -5.7 83.3% (L) 
  
 
                                                          
 75. See generally Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 406–51 
(discussing factors that influence decisionmaking at the certiorari stage); Cordray & Cordray, 
Strategy in Case Selection, supra note 41, at 16–30 (discussing the evidence of non-merits-oriented 
factors in the Justices’ voting behavior). 
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 With one exception, the conservative and moderate-conservative 
Justices had higher (and often considerably higher) grant rates in high-
profile cases than the liberal and moderate-liberal Justices.  The one 
exception was Justice Ginsburg, whose grant rate in such cases was 
slightly higher than that of other moderate-liberal Justices; but again, our 
data on her voting behavior is limited to her first Term. 
Moreover, with the exception of Justice Ginsburg, all of the Justices 
whose grant rates were “out of order” in the group of all cases granted 
moved into their natural place in the group of high-profile cases.  Chief 
Justice Burger, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy rose out of the 
bottom tier, with Chief Justice Burger tallying the highest difference by 
voting to grant 20.7% more high-profile than low-profile cases, Justice 
Kennedy voting to grant 11.6% more and Justice Scalia voting to grant 
8.5% more.  At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Justice 
Blackmun moved down the ladder to join the other moderate-liberal 
Justices, voting to grant 5.7% fewer cases in the high-profile group. 
On the other hand, for most of the Justices, the margin of difference 
in their high-profile and low-profile grant rates was not statistically 
significant.76  Indeed, the difference was statistically significant only for 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Kennedy, whose grant rates rose 
dramatically in high-profile cases.  For the rest, the results suggest that 
their approach to granting high-profile cases may be neither more 
strategic nor more institution-minded, but rather roughly comparable to 
their approach in low-profile cases.77 
Nonetheless, the pattern that emerged from the data is hard to ignore: 
in this conservative period of the Court, virtually all of the conservative 
and moderate-conservative Justices voted to grant high-profile cases at a 
greater rate than low-profile cases, and virtually all of the liberal and 
                                                          
 76. In the social sciences, a comparison is considered to be statistically significant if there is 
only a 5% chance that the difference in means observed could have occurred by chance alone.  In 
calculating significance, the comparisons are dependent on the observed differences between the 
means in light of the number of observations.  See EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL 
RESEARCH 458 (6th ed. 1992) (discussing statistical significance); THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & 
RONALD J. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 552 (5th ed. 1990) (same).  In our study, the 
difference in Chief Justice Burger’s grant rate in high-profile and low-profile cases was statistically 
significant at the conventional 5% level, the difference in Justice Kennedy’s was statistically 
significant at the 10% level, and the differences for all the other Justices were not statistically 
significant.  (There was insufficient data to evaluate Justice Ginsburg’s results.) 
 77. It is also possible that there are non-strategic reasons that motivate conservative Justices to 
a greater extent than liberal Justices to vote to grant cases that just happen to be high-profile in 
nature.  For example, conservative Justices may be more inclined to feel that the lower courts have 
been too “activist” in cases presenting questions that properly belong to the political branches—
cases which would tend to be high-profile—and thus vote more frequently to grant for that non-
strategic reason. 
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moderate-liberal Justices voted to grant high-profile cases at a lower rate 
than low-profile cases.78  This pattern, combined with the overall higher 
grant rates of the conservative and moderate-conservative Justices, at 
least suggests that the Justices’ willingness to vote to grant high-profile 
cases is linked to their likelihood of winning those cases on the merits, 
which in turn suggests that the Justices behave more strategically in 
high-profile cases. 
B. Degree of Unanimity in Voting at the Certiorari Stage 
We also considered the Justices’ level of agreement in granting high-
profile cases as opposed to low-profile cases.  To do this, we calculated 
the percentage of cases that were granted with each possible vote total 
(from nine votes to four votes) for each of the 1983–1993 Terms.79  We 
then compared the percentage of cases granted with each vote total for 
low-profile versus high-profile cases. 
Although there was a fair degree of variation among the Terms, the 
most striking result was the nearly uniform decline in high-profile cases 
granted with a bare four votes.  In nine of the eleven Terms in our 
dataset, the Justices granted a smaller percentage of high-profile cases 
with only four votes than they did low-profile cases.80  Overall, the 
percentage of high-profile cases granted with the minimum four votes 
was 10% lower than that of low-profile cases.  As Tables 3 and 4 
indicate, in our 1983–1993 sample an average of 31% of the low-profile 
cases were granted with the minimum four votes, whereas an average of 




                                                          
 78. Only two Justices broke the pattern.  The conservative Justice White voted to grant a 
slightly lower percentage of high-profile cases, but given his unusually high grant rate (90% in all 
cases granted), his modest drop in voting for high-profile cases could actually reflect a strategic 
preference not to grant cases that the liberals were likely to win.  In addition, the moderate-liberal 
Justice Stevens’s grant rate moved up slightly in high-profile cases. 
 79. On certiorari, four votes are sufficient for the Court to grant a case for full review on the 
merits.  See Revesz & Karlan, supra note 13, at 1069–70 (describing the origins of the “Rule of 
Four”).  In one high-profile case, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), we were only able 
to track down three votes to grant from the available docket books.  We did not include this case in 
our comparison. 
 80. In calculating the average percentages, we averaged the per-Term percentages over the 
eleven Terms. 
 81. This difference is statistically significant at the conventional 5% level.  See supra note 76 
(discussing statistical significance). 
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Table 3: Average Percentage of Votes to Grant in High-Profile Cases 
Term # Cases 4 Votes 5 Votes 6 Votes 7 Votes 8 Votes 9 Votes 
1993 11 18% 9% 9% 9% 9% 45% 
1992 17 35% 12% 0% 12% 6% 35% 
1991 10 0% 40% 40% 10% 0% 10% 
1990 16 19% 13% 25% 19% 6% 13% 
1989 13 23% 23% 15% 15% 8% 15% 
1988 20 15% 30% 20% 0% 20% 15% 
1987 18 17% 22% 6% 11% 28% 17% 
1986 11 27% 36% 18% 0% 18% 0% 
1985 18 50% 22% 0% 11% 6% 11% 
1984 13 15% 62% 8% 0% 15% 0% 
1983 14 14% 36% 7% 7% 29% 7% 
Average  21% 28% 13% 9% 13% 15% 
 
 
Table 4: Average Percentage of Votes to Grant in Low-Profile Cases 
Term # Cases 4 Votes 5 Votes 6 Votes 7 Votes 8 Votes 9 Votes 
1993 81 27% 14% 11% 11% 12% 25% 
1992 82 20% 18% 12% 17% 12% 21% 
1991 101 33% 16% 14% 10% 13% 15% 
1990 112 29% 21% 10% 15% 11% 13% 
1989 107 36% 18% 16% 15% 6% 9% 
1988 117 32% 15% 16% 11% 16% 10% 
1987 138 38% 18% 21% 9% 8% 5% 
1986 145 30% 24% 18% 10% 12% 7% 
1985 157 33% 13% 19% 12% 11% 11% 
1984 162 38% 22% 21% 9% 7% 4% 
1983 123 26% 22% 21% 15% 10% 7% 
Average  31% 18% 16% 12% 11% 12% 
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Because it takes five votes to win on the merits, this marked decline 
in cases granted with a four-vote minority suggests that the Justices are 
thinking more strategically about whether they will ultimately win on the 
merits when they are deciding whether to grant high-profile cases.  
Indeed, in a number of high-profile cases where certiorari was granted 
with a bare minority of four votes, three or even all four of the Justices 
voting to grant ended up losing on the merits.  Results such as these—in 
key constitutional cases such as Board of Education of Kiryas Joel 
Village School District v. Grumet,82 TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance 
Resources Corp.,83 McCleskey v. Kemp,84 Grand Rapids School District 
v. Ball,85 and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists86—would tend to serve as reminders of the risk involved 
in voting to grant an important case based on the assumption that 
somehow a crucial fifth vote would materialize later on the merits.  At 
other times, of course, the Justices voting as a minority to grant did 
succeed in picking up enough votes to win on the merits,87 but that 
prospect was at least a somewhat hazardous one. 
Interestingly, the percentage of cases granted with five votes (enough 
to form a majority on the merits) went up in eight of the eleven Terms in 
our dataset, and overall the percentage of high-profile cases granted with 
five votes was 10% higher than in low-profile cases.88  In contrast to 
                                                          
 82. 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (constitutionality of providing special education services to children in 
parochial schools under the Establishment Clause; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas voted to grant and ended up in dissent while Justice Kennedy voted to grant and ended up 
concurring in the judgment). 
 83. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (constitutionality of punitive damages award under the Due Process 
Clause; Justices White, O’Connor, and Souter voted to grant and ended up in dissent while Justice 
Blackmun voted to grant and ended up joining the plurality opinion). 
 84. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (constitutionality of Georgia’s capital punishment system under the 
Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause; Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens voted to grant and ended up in dissent). 
 85. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (constitutionality of classes provided primarily to parochial school 
children at public expense under the Establishment Clause; Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, 
Rehnquist, and O’Connor voted to grant and ended up in partial or full dissent), overruled by 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 86. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (constitutionality of informed consent law for abortions under the Due 
Process Clause; Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor voted to grant 
and ended up in dissent), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 87. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (applicability of 
federal civil rights laws to persons obstructing access to abortion clinics; four grant votes led to a 
majority opinion with a concurrence); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (constitutionality of 
victim impact statement in capital murder trial under the Eighth Amendment; four grant votes led to 
a majority opinion), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Local 28 of the Sheet 
Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (scope of coverage for racial 
discrimination under Title VII; four grant votes led to a majority opinion with a concurrence). 
 88. Id.  In our 1983–1993 sample, an average of 18% of the low-profile cases were granted 
with five votes, whereas an average of 28% of high-profile cases were granted with five votes.  See 
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cases where the four Justices voting to grant ultimately lost on the merits 
are cases where the same five Justices who voted to grant won an 
ultimate 5-4 victory on the merits, such as Dolan v. City of Tigard,89 
Spallone v. United States,90 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.91  
And, as would be expected, in other cases their five grant votes 
sometimes served as the foundation for much broader victories on the 
merits.92 
Even so, the Justices still granted a significant percentage of high-
profile cases with a minority of votes—21% in our dataset.  Since 
granting a highly controversial case with only four votes means that the 
granting Justices do not start with a majority, this behavior seems non-
strategic at first blush.  In each of these cases, the Justices who voted to 
grant may well have done so because they believed that it was the 
Court’s institutional responsibility to hear the case, regardless of whether 
the ultimate outcome would coincide with their ideological preferences.  
It is, however, entirely possible that the four Justices’ willingness to 
grant stemmed not from their sense of institutional responsibility, but 
rather from their hope or expectation that they would be able to pull in a 
fifth Justice on the merits.  In some cases, Justices might be willing to 
take greater risks in this way to “move” precedent, which cannot be 
achieved by denials of certiorari alone.93 
                                                                                                                       
supra tbls.3 & 4.  This difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.  See supra note 76 
(discussing statistical significance). 
 89. 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (constitutionality of city’s requirement that landowner dedicate private 
land for a public greenway under the Takings Clause; Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas voted to grant and constituted the majority on the merits). 
 90. 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (determination of whether federal judicial remedial powers authorize 
contempt sanctions imposing fines directly against city councilmembers; Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
along with Justices White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy voted to grant and constituted the 
majority on the merits). 
 91. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (determination of when the evidence will support a disparate impact 
claim for racial discrimination under Title VII; Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices White, 
O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy voted to grant and constituted the majority on the merits), 
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized 
in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
 92. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) 
(constitutionality of denying a church access to school premises open to other groups under the Free 
Speech Clause; five grant votes led to unanimous result with two concurrences); Hustler Magazine 
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (application of more restrictive First Amendment standards to tort of 
emotional distress; five grant votes led to unanimous result with one concurrence); Western Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (scope of coverage for age discrimination under the 
ADEA; five grant votes led to unanimous decision on the merits). 
 93. One account of the Warren Court describes such a situation, in which Justice Brennan 
urged Chief Justice Warren to take a particular case to try to extend to the states the doctrine of 
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), which required the prosecution to turn over witness 
statements to the defense: 
‘I suppose there would be a vehement protest,’ Brennan wrote, ‘and the probabilities are 
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Overall, the Justices granted high-profile cases with higher vote 
totals than they did low-profile cases.  In addition to granting a much 
higher percentage of high-profile cases with five votes instead of four, 
the Justices acted with substantial unanimity (casting eight or nine votes) 
in a somewhat greater percentage of high-profile cases than low-profile 
cases.94  This increase at the upper end suggests that the Justices are 
indeed motivated, to some extent, by a sense of institutional 
responsibility to hear certain high-profile cases whose importance is 
indisputable.  Over one-quarter of the cases in the high-profile category 
(and 5% more cases than in the low-profile category) were granted with 
substantial unanimity, despite the fact that the Court tends to be more 
closely divided in such cases on the merits.95  Many of these “consensus” 
grants—including, for example, such textbook cases as Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell,96 Chisom v. Roemer,97 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,98 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,99 and Mistretta v. United 
States100—address fundamental constitutional issues of undeniable 
importance. 
As we discuss in more detail below, the Justices do vote to grant 
high-profile cases that they ultimately lose on the merits, and indeed, 
they lose more frequently on the merits in high-profile cases that they 
                                                                                                                       
we would lose out on the merits.  The latter probability may be good reason to pass up 
this opportunity, but I do think we’ll wait a long time before we get a question as sharply 
presented.’  Warren persuaded Brennan to pass up the case.  But other opportunities 
would soon come along.  The chief and the ‘deputy chief’ vowed to watch for them.  
Then, they believed, they would make history. 
EISLER, supra note 26, at 165. 
 94. In our 1983–1993 sample, an average of 11% of the low-profile cases were granted with 
eight votes and 12% were granted with nine votes, whereas an average of 13% of the high-profile 
cases were granted with eight votes and 15% were granted with nine votes.  See supra tbls.3 & 4.  
These differences, however, were not statistically significant.  See supra note 76 (discussing 
statistical significance). 
 95. We tracked the Justices’ votes from certiorari through the merits in five Terms (1993, 1992, 
1991, 1988, and 1984).  See infra Part III.D (discussing our selection of the sample Terms).  In our 
sample Terms, the average size of the majority on the merits was seven Justices in low-profile cases, 
whereas it was only six Justices in high-profile cases, reflecting the predictably deeper and more 
persistent ideological divides among the Justices in deciding the merits of “hot-button” issues. 
 96. 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (constitutionality of hate crime laws under the First Amendment). 
 97. 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (applicability of Voting Rights Act claim for diluting minority voting 
strength to judicial elections). 
 98. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (constitutionality of affirmative action policies for minority preference 
and broadcast diversity under the Equal Protection Clause), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 99. 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (constitutionality of employee drug testing under the Fourth 
Amendment, heard together with National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989), which was also granted unanimously). 
 100. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (constitutionality of federal sentencing guidelines under the separation 
of powers doctrine). 
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voted to grant than they do in low-profile cases that they voted to grant.  
This data, combined with the higher percentage of high-profile cases 
granted with substantial unanimity, suggests that institutional 
considerations are driving the Justices’ decisionmaking at least to some 
extent. 
Nonetheless, we think that the more natural interpretation of the 
downward plunge in high-profile cases granted with a minority of votes 
is that Justices are more concerned about granting such cases without a 
dependable majority with which to prevail at the merits stage.  Although 
there was a modest rise in the percentage of high-profile cases granted 
with substantial unanimity, it was not statistically significant, and it was 
coupled with a corresponding drop in cases granted with six or seven 
votes.101  Thus, while institutional considerations likely play a role in the 
Justices’ decisions to vote to grant some of the most obviously important 
high-profile cases, it seems that such considerations do not fully account 
for the much larger shift away from cases granted with a minority of 
votes.  Instead, strategic concerns are the more likely explanation for the 
much smaller percentage of high-profile cases granted with a mere four 
votes (and corresponding increase in high-profile cases granted with five 
votes). 
C. Voting Patterns Among Ideologically Aligned and Ideologically 
Opposed Justices 
To gauge further whether the Justices act more strategically in high-
profile cases, we considered whether Justices who are ideologically 
aligned on the merits tend to vote together more frequently on certiorari 
in high-profile cases than they vote together on certiorari in the full set of 
cases granted.  We also considered the converse: whether Justices who 
are ideologically opposed on the merits tend to vote together less 
frequently on certiorari in high-profile cases than they vote together on 
certiorari in the full set of cases granted. 
In a recent Article, we looked more generally at whether Justices 
who are aligned on the merits also tend to vote together at the certiorari 
stage, and whether Justices who are opposed on the merits also tend to 
                                                          
 101. In our 1983–1993 sample, an average of 16% of the low-profile cases were granted with six 
votes and 12% were granted with seven votes, whereas an average of 13% of the high-profile cases 
were granted with six votes and 9% were granted with seven votes.  See supra tbls.3 & 4.  The 
difference in low-profile versus high-profile cases granted with six votes was not statistically 
significant, but it was statistically significant at the 10% level for cases granted with seven votes.  
See supra note 76 (discussing statistical significance). 
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disagree at the certiorari stage.102  To do that analysis, we used the 
Harvard Law Review’s annual statistical recaps to assess how 
ideologically in sync the Justices are.  The statistical recaps, which 
provide information on voting alignments in merits cases, report how 
frequently each pair of Justices agreed in cases decided on the merits.103  
They thus provide a good measure of the Justices’ ideological 
compatibility as a general matter. 
We then compiled comparable voting alignment information at the 
certiorari stage for each pair of Justices, using data on the Justices’ case 
selection votes for the 1983 through the 1993 Terms that we gathered 
from the docket books of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall.104  
In compiling the certiorari voting alignment information, we included in 
our dataset the Justices’ case selection votes in all cases granted for 
plenary review on the merits, in order to make the most direct 
comparison of the Justices’ voting behavior at the case selection stage 
versus the merits stage.105 
                                                          
 102. See Cordray & Cordray, Strategy in Case Selection, supra note 41, at 1–3, 16–30. 
 103. The Harvard Law Review treats two Justices as having voted together “whenever they join 
in the same opinion, as indicated either by the reporter or by the explicit statement of a Justice in the 
body of his own opinion.”  The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 93, 307 n.f  (1968).  It 
calculates the percentage of agreement by dividing the number of times that one Justice voted with 
another in opinions of the Court, opinions announcing the judgment of the Court, concurrences, and 
dissents by the number of cases in which both Justices participated.  See id.; see also id. at 301–02 
(describing more fully how it calculates the statistics). 
 104. We treated all “Join-3” votes as votes to grant.  See supra note 67 (describing the Join-3 
vote and its functional equivalence to a vote to grant). 
 105. We restricted our dataset to cases that were granted, because so many of the certiorari 
petitions filed are frivolous.  Since the vast majority of petitions are unanimously denied, using the 
full set of petitions filed would obscure the real differences in voting behavior among the Justices in 
nonfrivolous cases.  Alternatively, we could have attempted to include in our dataset all cases in 
which a nonfrivolous petition was filed by, for example, including all cases that received at least one 
vote to grant.  We did not use this approach for two reasons.  First, limiting the dataset to cases that 
were granted makes the comparison between agreement on certiorari and agreement on the merits 
more direct because the two datasets contain approximately the same cases.  We caution, however, 
that the comparison is not exact.  This is primarily because we compared the Justices’ voting 
behavior in the Term during which they cast the votes, whether on certiorari or on the merits.  Many 
of the cases granted in one Term are not decided on the merits until a later Term, so the group of 
cases voted on at the certiorari stage will not mirror the group of cases voted on at the merits stage in 
any given Term.  A related problem occurs when a Justice joins or leaves the Court, because he or 
she will have cast some votes at one stage but not the other.  Also, we included in our certiorari 
dataset all cases that were granted, so that dataset contains some cases that were dismissed before the 
Court issued an opinion on the merits.  Nonetheless, the overall comparison is quite close, especially 
since we averaged the voting alignments data over the Terms that each pair of Justices sat together. 
The second reason we opted against using the larger group of nonfrivolous cases is that it allows 
the unusual voting behavior of one Justice to create a false sense of agreement among the other eight 
Justices.  See also supra note 68 (discussing method of calculating grant rates).  For example, Justice 
White voted to grant approximately 100 more cases per Term than any other Justice.  Including all of 
those cases would significantly, but somewhat misleadingly, increase the rate of agreement among 
the eight other Justices.  We recognize, however, that there are downsides to restricting the data pool 
 
08_CORDRAY FINAL 11/30/2008  6:09:41 PM 
2009] SETTING THE SOCIAL AGENDA 341 
We found that Justices who are ideologically aligned on the merits 
tend to vote together on certiorari much more frequently than those 
Justices who are ideologically opposed on the merits, indicating that 
there is a strong ideological or strategic element to the Justices’ 
decisionmaking on certiorari.106  But we also found that the rate of 
agreement between almost all Justices was significantly lower on 
certiorari than on the merits, suggesting that other factors also play an 
important role in the Justices’ case selection decisions.107 
For this Article, we used the same data and methodology, but we 
segregated the high-profile cases in order to assess whether the Justices 
behave differently in such cases.  We found that the Justices who were 
most closely aligned on the merits not only tended to vote together on 
certiorari, they also tended to vote together even more frequently on 
certiorari in high-profile cases.  Over the eleven Terms we studied, there 
were seventy-six pairs of Justices, of which twenty-three had a merits 
agreement rate over 75%.  Of these ideologically-aligned pairs, twenty-
one (all but two) had a higher agreement rate on certiorari in high-profile 
cases than they did in the group of all cases granted.108  Moreover, the 
extent of the increase in the rate of agreement in high-profile cases was 
also more pronounced for these closely aligned pairings.  While the 
average increase in the rate of agreement was 2.2% for the entire set of 
seventy-six pairings, the average increase in the rate of agreement was 
5.9% for the closely-aligned Justices (i.e., those with a merits agreement 
rate of over 75%).109 
The results were similar at the other end of the spectrum.  Nineteen 
pairs agreed on the merits less than 55% of the time.  Of these 
ideologically-opposed pairs, twelve (all but seven) had a lower 
                                                                                                                       
to cases granted.  See Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting, supra note 35, at 552 (discussing 
problems of limiting dataset to cases granted).  In particular, it is harder to identify certain kinds of 
strategic behavior, such as successful defensive denials, as well as certain kinds of non-strategic 
behavior.  Justice White, for instance, felt strongly that the Court should hear cases presenting 
conflicts among the lower courts, and he voted to grant a large number of cases for that purpose.  
See, e.g., Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038, 1040 (1990) (mem.) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (“[I]t is plain enough to me that quite a number of the cases involving conflicts 
have been denied review but could have been granted without presenting any danger of not being 
current in our docket.”). 
 106. See Cordray & Cordray, Strategy in Case Selection, supra note 41, at 20–21. 
 107. See id. at 21–23. 
 108. See Appendix B (setting out the pairings of Justices ranked ordinally by their agreement 
rate on the merits, averaged over the eleven Terms; their agreement rate and ordinal ranking on 
certiorari for all cases granted; and their agreement rate and ordinal ranking on certiorari for high-
profile cases). 
 109. See id.  We computed the average change in agreement rate by subtracting each pair of 
Justices’ agreement rate on certiorari in all cases granted from their agreement rate in high-profile 
cases.  We then averaged the results for all pairs. 
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agreement rate on certiorari in high-profile cases than they did in the 
group of all cases granted.110  Even more strikingly, all eight of the pairs 
that agreed on the merits less than 50% of the time agreed even less 
frequently on certiorari in high-profile cases than they did in all cases 
granted.111  Not surprisingly, the average change in agreement rate for 
these ideologically-opposed Justices differed from the norm as well: 
while on average the full set of Justices voted together 2.2% more 
frequently on certiorari in high-profile cases than in all cases granted, the 
group of Justices with a merits agreement rate of less than 55% voted 
together 1.7% less frequently in high-profile cases than in all cases 
granted, and the group of Justices with a merits agreement rate of less 
than 50% voted together 5% less frequently in high-profile cases.112 
These results indicate that ideological and strategic concerns about 
how the Court will ultimately decide a case on the merits play an even 
greater role in the Justices’ certiorari decisions about whether to grant 
high-profile cases.  While the overall increase in agreement rate in high-
profile cases suggests that institutional concerns may hold some sway 
with the Justices in a certain number of these cases, the size of the 
increase was quite modest.  On the whole, then, this data lends support 
for the view that the Justices tend to act more strategically in high-profile 
cases. 
D. Voting Behavior on the Merits in Cases the Justices Voted to Grant 
To explore further whether the Justices act more strategically in 
high-profile cases, we tracked each Justice’s voting behavior from 
certiorari through the merits for five Terms: 1993, 1992, 1991, 1988, and 
1984.  In selecting the five Terms sampled, we chose the three most 
recent Terms for which certiorari voting data was available and two 
Terms from the 1980s (we used 1988 and 1984 because the Court had no 
changes in personnel during either of those Terms or in the Terms 
immediately succeeding them, when many of the cases granted were 
decided on the merits). 
We analyzed the data in two ways.  First, we looked at how 
frequently a Justice’s vote to grant certiorari was followed by a vote to 
reverse on the merits.  Second, we looked at how frequently a Justice’s 
vote to grant certiorari was followed by a win on the merits.113 
                                                          
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. We are indebted to Banks Miller, who performed the statistical analysis on our data in this 
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1. Vote to Grant Followed by a Vote to Reverse on the Merits 
In the political science literature, tracking the frequency with which a 
Justice votes to grant certiorari and then votes to reverse on the merits is 
a relatively standard measure of the extent to which the Justices’ 
certiorari decisions are motivated by their own ideological 
inclinations.114  In general, this approach assumes that a Justice is more 
likely to vote to grant a case when the lower court result conflicts with 
his or her own ideological preferences.115  Although this method fails to 
distinguish between cases in which a Justice’s inclination for error 
correction is fundamentally ideological and those in which it is based on 
non-ideological legal considerations,116 it does provide some measure of 
ideology’s role in the decisionmaking calculus. 
With this measure, we considered the rate at which Justices voted to 
grant and then voted to reverse on the merits in low-profile cases as 
compared to the rate at which they did so in high-profile cases.117  
Overall, there was no difference between the two categories: Justices 
who voted to grant and then voted to reverse did so in 62.9% of low-
profile cases and in 63.3% of high-profile cases.  Table 5, below, 
displays the individual percentages. 
 
Table 5: Percentage of Cases in Which Justices Voted  
to Grant and Then to Reverse on the Merits 
Justice High-Profile Low-Profile 
Overall 63.3% 62.9% 
Burger 80.0% 70.0% 
Brennan 63.6% 60.4% 
                                                                                                                       
section. 
 114. For studies employing this method, see supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing 
the political science literature). 
 115. For studies finding that a preference for reversal contains a strong ideological component, 
see supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the political science literature). 
 116. In areas such as tax, bankruptcy, or patent law, for example, it seems likely that purely legal 
considerations, rather than ideological considerations, will predominate.  See also Caldeira et al., 
Sophisticated Voting, supra note 35, at 552–53 (discussing other limitations of this method). 
 117. At the certiorari stage, we included all votes to grant, note jurisdiction, postpone decision 
on jurisdiction, and Join-3 as votes to grant.  See supra note 67 (discussing Join-3 votes).  At the 
merits stage, we treated Justices as voting to reverse in all cases where (1) they joined the majority, 
concurred, or concurred in the judgment in a case that was reversed, reversed in part and affirmed in 
part, or vacated and remanded; or (2) they dissented, concurred in part and dissented in part, or 
concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part in a case that was affirmed or affirmed in part 
(as long as nothing was reversed). 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Justice High-Profile Low-Profile 
White 63.0% 63.8% 
Marshall 69.2% 55.9% 
Blackmun 61.9% 60.6% 
Powell 66.7% 65.1% 
Rehnquist 67.9% 65.3% 
Stevens 62.8% 71.4% 
O’Connor 69.4% 60.5% 
Scalia 52.4% 61.4% 
Kennedy 59.5% 59.3% 
Souter 64.3% 66.0% 
Thomas 57.1% 58.4% 
Ginsburg 62.5% 63.6% 
 
The most obvious explanation for this result is, of course, that the 
Justices approach high-profile cases in the same way that they do low-
profile cases, meaning that they generally (but certainly not always) vote 
to grant cases that they want to reverse on the merits.  Another 
possibility, however, is that in high-profile cases the Justices do act more 
strategically, but the evidence of such behavior is obscured in the voting 
data.  This might occur if the Justices are also aggressively granting more 
cases that they wish to affirm.118  A Justice’s keen interest in a high-
profile issue might lead the Justice not only to vote to grant cases that he 
or she believes were wrongly decided below, but also to vote to grant 
cases that were rightly decided below, if they are likely to be affirmed on 
the merits (and thus become the law of the land).  In other words, a 
Justice’s voting behavior might be highly strategic in high-profile cases, 
in the sense that the Justice is voting to grant based on whether he or she 
will likely win on the merits, regardless of whether the Justice thinks that 
the result below should be reversed or affirmed. 
 
                                                          
 118. An “aggressive grant” occurs when a Justice votes to grant a case in order to affirm and 
thus give broader effect to a desirable result below by extending its precedential effect nationwide.  
See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 36, at 80 (describing aggressive grants). 
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Although studies suggest that the Justices are much more hesitant to 
vote to grant cases that they wish to affirm because they have more to 
lose,119 high-profile cases present a different calculus of costs and 
benefits.  In high-profile cases, the Justices may perceive themselves as 
having more at stake, but they may also have a better sense of how most 
of their colleagues will vote and a greater desire to see their preferred 
outcome achieved at the Supreme Court level in order to set a binding 
precedent throughout the country.  For these reasons, it seems plausible 
that at least the Justices who expect to be in the majority are more 
frequently reaching out to grant high-profile cases that they wish to 
affirm.120 
The data, however, does not appear to support this hypothesis.  As 
noted above, the rate at which the Justices collectively voted to grant and 
then voted to affirm on the merits in low-profile versus high-profile cases 
was the same: overall, Justices who voted to grant and then voted to 
affirm did so in 37.1% of low-profile cases and in 36.7% of high-profile 
cases.  Even more telling, although there was some variation in the rates 
at which the individual Justices voted to reverse in high-profile versus 
low-profile cases, none of those variations were statistically 
significant.121  During this conservative period of the Court, one would 
expect to see the more conservative Justices reaching out more 
aggressively to grant and affirm in high-profile cases, yet there were no 
differences among any of the Justices, let alone blocs of Justices.  
Moreover, in the larger set of all cases granted (regardless of whether the 
Justice had voted to grant or deny at the certiorari stage), there was 
virtually no difference in the rate at which Justices voted to affirm in 
high-profile versus low-profile cases: overall, Justices voted to affirm in 
42% of the low-profile cases and in 43% of the high-profile cases.  And 
again, although there was some variation in the rates of the individual 
Justices, none of those variations were statistically significant.122  Table 6 
sets out the affirmance rates for each Justice. 
                                                          
 119. See supra note 35 (citing studies). 
 120. Likewise, in these high-stakes cases Justices may be more careful to vote for a “good 
vehicle,” and a case decided in the Justice’s preferred direction below may present better facts. 
 121. The differences in the rates at which the individual Justices voted to grant and then voted to 
reverse in high-profile versus low-profile cases were not statistically significant for any Justice at the 
conventional 5% level, and were statistically significant for only one Justice (Justice O’Connor) at 
the 10% level.  See supra note 76 (discussing statistical significance). 
 122. See supra note 76 (discussing statistical significance).  In our study, the differences in the 
rates at which the individual Justices voted to affirm in high-profile versus low-profile cases were 
not statistically significant for any Justice at the conventional 5% level or at the more generous 10% 
level. 
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Table 6: Percentage of All Cases in Which Justice Voted to Affirm on the Merits 
Regardless of Whether Justice Voted to Grant or Deny Certiorari 
Justice High-Profile Low-Profile 
Overall 43.0% 42.2% 
Burger 30.8% 36.4% 
Brennan 60.6% 49.8% 
White 38.5% 35.1% 
Marshall 60.6% 54.9% 
Blackmun 46.9% 43.9% 
Powell 41.7% 44.4% 
Rehnquist 42.3% 40.6% 
Stevens 46.5% 44.6% 
O’Connor 35.2% 38.0% 
Scalia 44.8% 43.1% 
Kennedy 36.2% 40.5% 
Souter 36.8% 35.9% 
Thomas 39.5% 46.4% 
Ginsburg 45.5% 40.3% 
 
The more conventional explanation thus appears to be the more 
likely one: with respect to voting to grant cases that they want to reverse 
on the merits, the Justices approach high-profile cases at the certiorari 
stage in very much the same way that they do low-profile cases. 
2. Vote to Grant Followed by a Win on the Merits 
Because the Court and the Justices have so much at stake in high-
profile cases, the frequency with which the Justices vote to grant 
certiorari and then win on the merits may be a better indicator of whether 
the Justices behave more strategically in high-profile cases.  And 
conversely, the frequency with which a Justice votes to grant and then 
loses on the merits may tell us something about the Justice’s willingness 
to take a case because he or she believes that it is the Court’s institutional 
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Therefore, we also analyzed the voting data in our five-Term sample 
by tracking how frequently a Justice’s vote to grant certiorari was 
followed by a win on the merits.123  The results were surprising.  As 
Table 7 shows, every Justice but one had a lower winning percentage in 
high-profile cases than in low-profile cases, and for most, the difference 
was statistically significant.124  On average, there was an 11% drop in the 
Justices’ winning percentage from low-profile cases to high-profile 
cases: Justices who voted to grant low-profile cases won 82.6% of those 
cases on the merits, whereas Justices who voted to grant high-profile 
cases won only 71.6% of those cases on the merits. 
 
Table 7: Percentage of Cases Where Justice Voted to Grant and Won on the Merits 
Justice High-Profile Low-Profile Significance    (p-value) 
Overall 71.6% 82.6% 0.000 
Burger 70.0% 90.0% 0.038 
Brennan 45.5% 72.9% 0.028 
White 76.1% 88.9% 0.007 
Marshall 46.2% 68.5% 0.055 
Blackmun 64.3% 72.6% 0.133 
Powell 100% 88.4% 0.870 
Rehnquist 73.6% 87.6% 0.003 
Stevens 53.5% 70.6% 0.012 
O’Connor 77.9% 85.1% 0.082 
Scalia 74.4% 86.2% 0.027 
Kennedy 87.8% 93.5% 0.101 
Souter 82.1% 83.1% 0.449 
Thomas 71.4% 82.5% 0.084 
Ginsburg 50.0% 87.3% 0.005 
                                                          
 123. See supra note 117 (describing how we coded the Justices’ votes in cases on certiorari and 
on the merits). 
 124. See supra note 76 (discussing statistical significance; if the p-value is less than .05, then the 
difference is significant at the conventional 5% level).  Of the thirteen Justices who had a lower 
winning percentage in high-profile cases, the drop for ten was significant at the 10% level, and for 
seven of those it was significant at the 5% level.  Justice Powell, on whom we had very limited data 
during our five sample Terms (he served during only one of those Terms), had a winning percentage 
of 100% in high-profile cases in our sample; he was the only Justice whose winning percentage was 
higher in high-profile cases than low-profile cases. 
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The most obvious reason for the generally lower “win” rate in high-
profile cases is that these cases are decided by closer votes on the merits 
than are the low-profile cases.  In our five-Term sample, for instance, 
there were on average 6.2 votes for the majority in high-profile cases, as 
opposed to 7.1 votes for the majority in low-profile cases.125  This may or 
may not suggest that high-profile cases are harder cases, but it certainly 
indicates that they are more divisive cases. 
But this fact still does not explain why virtually every Justice loses a 
higher percentage of the cases in which they would be expected to act 
most strategically.  One possibility is that, although the Justices are 
voting strategically (or more so) in these cases, they have a harder time 
gauging their chances of winning, and so they miscalculate more often.  
We have assumed that the Justices are better positioned to assess their 
chances of winning in high-profile cases because they are more familiar 
with their colleagues’ views in these controversial areas.  But the closer 
votes on the merits in these cases tend to make them harder to predict, 
and in many of them the Justices may not know how the critical swing 
Justices will vote.  Indeed, in some cases, the swing Justices themselves 
remain unsure about their own positions even after they have cast their 
initial votes at conference, and they do not ultimately reach a decision on 
the merits until the opinion writing is well underway.126 
Further, victories in high-profile cases likely matter more to the 
Justices than victories in low-profile cases, so a Justice might be willing 
to take more risk in high-profile cases, because the rewards of winning 
are higher.  In other words, even a Justice who is voting strategically 
might reasonably take more risks in high-profile cases, because the pay-
off for success is much greater.  Thus, if strategic voting is occurring, it 
is likely to be of an even more sophisticated nature, where the Justice 
does not just make a simple judgment about whether he or she will win 
                                                          
 125. In high-profile cases, there were 421 votes for the majority in 68 cases; in low-profile cases, 
there were 3047 votes for the majority in 428 cases.  It is worth noting that our method of selecting 
high-profile cases may have exaggerated this difference, because the New York Times’ and the 
Harvard Law Review’s choice of leading cases to discuss may have been influenced by the closeness 
of the ultimate vote on the merits.  See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (explaining our 
method of selecting the high-profile cases). 
 126. See, e.g., JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 70–77, 139–60 (2007) 
(discussing swing Justices changing their votes on the merits after the conference in crucial 
situations in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(abortion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (religious freedom); and Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (civil rights law), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 
U.S. 244 (1994)); JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 519–30 (1994) (same for 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (gay rights), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003)). 
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on the merits, but also considers the likelihood of winning in relation to 
both political (strategic) and non-political (institutional) judgments about 
the importance of the case and its outcome. 
Our results are thus consistent with the possibility that the Justices 
are voting strategically in high-profile cases.  Even though the more 
conservative Justices had a lower winning percentage in high-profile 
cases they voted to grant than they did in low-profile cases they voted to 
grant, they still were winning a large percentage of the high-profile 
cases—typically over 70%.127  And the moderately conservative swing 
Justices in this era—Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Kennedy—were 
winning an even higher percentage of the high-profile cases.128  So even 
though the difficult terrain in these divisive cases may have caused them 
to fare less well than they did in low-profile cases, they were successful 
enough to justify a strategic aggressiveness in voting to grant the high-
profile cases. 
What is perhaps harder to explain on the strategic theory is the 
behavior of the more liberal Justices, who had the lowest winning 
percentages in high-profile cases that they voted to grant.129  Although 
these Justices were voting to grant many fewer high-profile cases than 
their more conservative colleagues,130 presumably for defensive 
reasons,131 they were still voting to grant such cases with some 
frequency.132  Given their dreary prospects in the high-profile cases, it 
may be that they were simply willing to “risk it” in cases where the 
outcome was at least uncertain or where a particularly compelling set of 
facts might sway one or more of the swing Justices to their side.  And 
even on issues that the more liberal Justices knew they would lose, they 
                                                          
 127. These Justices include Chief Justice Burger (70.0%), Chief Justice Rehnquist (73.6%), 
Justice Scalia (74.4%), and Justice Thomas (71.4%).  See supra tbl.7. 
 128. Not surprisingly, the Justices with the highest winning percentages in high-profile cases 
that they voted to grant during this period are all moderates: Justices Powell (100%), Kennedy 
(87.8%), Souter (82.1%), and O’Connor (77.9%).  See supra tbl.7; see also supra notes 69–71 and 
accompanying text (discussing the ideological inclinations of the Justices in our sample). 
 129. These Justices (with their winning percentages in the high-profile cases that they voted to 
grant) included Justices Brennan (45.5%), Marshall (46.2%), Stevens (53.5%), Souter (82.1%), and 
Ginsburg (50.0%).  See supra tbl.7. 
 130. See supra tbl.2 (setting out the frequency with which individual Justices voted to grant 
cases). 
 131. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the strategic use of “defensive 
denials”); see also MURPHY, supra note 53, at 29 (“It would also be difficult to deny that a policy-
oriented Justice may believe more strongly in self-restraint when his views are in the minority on the 
Court or when he believes that his views are more likely to triumph ultimately if the Court allows 
other government officials responsibility for choice.”). 
 132. The grant rates in high-profile cases for these Justices are as follows: Justices Brennan 
(48.0%), Marshall (45.9%), Stevens (54.9%), Souter (67.3%), and Ginsburg (72.7%).  See supra 
tbl.2. 
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still had a stake in selecting cases that would best enable them to 
minimize the extent of their losses. 
Another possibility, of course, is that the Justices were voting to 
grant at least some of the high-profile cases based on their sense of the 
Court’s institutional responsibilities, even though they recognized that 
they were likely to lose on the merits.  This would not be strategic 
behavior, but rather would reflect a view that despite one’s own deep 
convictions about the issues, in some cases it is the Court’s duty to step 
up and resolve pressing issues of social or national concern.  In addition, 
in the group of high-profile cases where the Justices are uncertain about 
the outcome on the merits (because, for example, the swing Justices 
themselves are unsure how they will vote), institutional considerations 
may take on greater importance.  In these cases, where the issue is of 
great national interest but neither side can predict the outcome, the 
Justices may vote to grant because institutional considerations impel 
them to do so.  A glance through Appendix A, which sets out the 
Justices’ case selection votes in all of the high-profile cases, supports the 
view that the Justices’ decisional calculus includes not merely strategy, 
but is a much more complicated mix of strategic, institutional, and 
jurisprudential considerations. 
Interestingly, and quite surprisingly, we found that the individual 
Justices’ winning percentage on the merits was virtually the same 
regardless of whether they voted to grant or deny review at the certiorari 
stage.  In the five Terms in our sample, this was true both for all cases 
and for the high-profile cases.  Table 8, below, compares each Justice’s 
winning percentages in all cases granted (regardless of whether the 
Justice voted to grant or deny certiorari) to the Justice’s winning 
percentage in cases he or she voted to grant. 
 
Table 8: Percentage of Cases in Which Justice Voted to Grant and Won  
on Merits Versus Percentage of All Cases in Which Justice Won  
on Merits Regardless of Certiorari Vote 
Justice 
High-Profile: 


















Overall 69.6% 71.6% 80.6% 82.6% 
Burger 61.5% 70.0% 90.2% 90.0% 
Brennan 45.5% 45.5% 64.2% 72.9% 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Justice 
High-Profile: 


















White 76.9% 76.1% 88.9% 88.9% 
Marshall 45.5% 46.2% 62.4% 68.5% 
Blackmun 60.6% 64.3% 72.5% 72.6% 
Powell 75.0% 100% 87.8% 88.4% 
Rehnquist 71.8% 73.6% 85.3% 87.6% 
Stevens 54.9% 53.5% 69.3% 70.6% 
O’Connor 78.9% 77.9% 85.2% 85.1% 
Scalia 77.6% 74.4% 85.2% 86.2% 
Kennedy 89.7% 87.8% 92.8% 93.5% 
Souter 78.9% 82.1% 85.0% 83.1% 
Thomas 76.3% 71.4% 80.0% 82.5% 
Ginsburg 54.5% 50.0% 87.5% 87.3% 
 
These figures suggest that whether a Justice is trying to secure 
plenary review of a case, trying to prevent it, or remaining on the 
sidelines has little bearing on whether the Justice will win on the merits.  
This may simply reflect that a Justice’s chances of ultimate success are 
dictated by the Court’s composition, and have little to do with which 
Justices selected the case for review.  In other words, the forces at work 
at the merits stage may limit the effectiveness of the Justices’ efforts to 
act strategically at the certiorari stage. 
Nevertheless, if strategic considerations are driving the Justices, and 
if this is especially so in high-profile cases, then it is odd that the Justices 
do not win more cases in which they supported review than they do cases 
in which they opposed it.  These results thus may be further evidence that 
the Justices are acting with a greater sense of institutional or judicial 
responsibility than the conventional wisdom suggests, in both high-
profile and low-profile cases. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
To the American public, the Supreme Court often seems to be in the 
center of the social and political fray, especially in June when the Court 
releases decision after decision in highly controversial, ideologically-
charged cases.  Although these high-profile cases make up only a small 
percentage of the Court’s workload, they dominate the public’s view of 
the Court, shaping not only the Court’s image, but also the country’s 
debate on divisive issues such as abortion, civil rights, religious freedom, 
and the distribution of political power. 
In this Article, we considered whether the Justices depart from their 
usual case selection criteria when they are faced with cases presenting 
high-profile issues.  Using data on the Justices’ certiorari votes from the 
private papers of retired Justices, we compared the Justices’ voting 
patterns on certiorari in high-profile cases to their voting patterns in low-
profile cases.  Through this comparison, we assessed whether, in making 
the very significant initial decision to place high-profile cases on the 
Court’s agenda, the Justices act more strategically, less strategically, or 
in much the same way that they approach all cases. 
We found substantial evidence that the Justices act more 
strategically—with a closer eye to whether they will win on the merits—
in voting to grant high-profile cases.  During the conservative period of 
the Court that we canvassed, conservative Justices tended to vote to grant 
high-profile cases at a greater rate than liberal Justices did; the Justices 
were markedly more reluctant to grant high-profile cases with a mere 
four votes; and at least at the extremes, ideologically-aligned Justices 
tended to vote together more frequently on certiorari in high-profile 
cases, while ideologically-opposed Justices tended to vote together less 
frequently on certiorari in high-profile cases. 
But when we tracked the individual Justices’ votes from certiorari 
through the merits, we found that the Justices who voted to grant 
ultimately voted to reverse in virtually the same percentage of high-
profile as low-profile cases, suggesting that they were employing a 
similar approach in the two sets of cases.  Moreover, Justices who voted 
to grant won on the merits significantly less often in the high-profile 
cases that they voted to grant than they did in the low-profile cases that 
they voted to grant.  Indeed, most of the liberal-leaning Justices were 
winning only around half of the high-profile cases that they had voted to 
grant.  Further, the individual Justices’ winning percentage on the merits 
was virtually the same regardless of whether they voted to grant or deny 
certiorari.  These results strongly suggest that when the Justices are 
deciding whether to review high-profile cases, their decisionmaking goes 
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well beyond a simple strategic calculation of the likelihood of winning 
on the merits.  In addition to the difficulty of factoring in strategic 
considerations effectively, these results suggest that the Justices are also 
concerned with other factors, such as the institutional standing of the 
Court and the integrity of its judicial processes. 
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APPENDIX A 
Certiorari Votes in High-Profile Cases* 
 
Cases Granted in the 
1983 Term WB WJB BRW TM HAB LFP WHR JPS SOC ∑ 
Hawaii Housing Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) N N N  N N N N N 8 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) N N  N N N N N N 8 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. 1032 (1984)   G  G  G G J 5 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420 (1984) G  G  G G G   5 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 
U.S. 1214 (1984)   G  G J G  G 5 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 498 
U.S. 609 (1984) N N N N N N N N N 9 
Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528 (1985) 
N N N N N N N  N 8 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Bldrs., Inc., 
472 U.S. 749 (1985) 
G G G G  G    5 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298 (1985) G    J  G  G 4 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38 (1985) N  N   N N N N 6 
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) G  G    G  J 4 
Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Nat’l Conservative Political 
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 
(1985) 
N N N N  N N N N 8 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U.S. 1 (1985) N  N   J N N  5 
Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 
703 (1985)  G G G G G G  G 7 
                                                          
 * The Justices are listed in order of seniority by their initials: Warren Burger (WB); William 
H. Rehnquist (WHR); William J. Brennan (WJB); Byron R. White (BRW); Thurgood Marshall 
(TM); Harry A. Blackmun (HAB); Lewis F. Powell (LFP); John Paul Stevens (JPS); Sandra Day 
O’Connor (SOC); Antonin Scalia (AS); Anthony M. Kennedy (AMK); David Souter (DS); Clarence 
Thomas (CT); Ruth Bader Ginsburg (RBG). 
 The Justices’ votes are identified as follows: G (grant), N (note jurisdiction), P (postpone 
consideration of jurisdiction), J (join 3), and blank (deny).  ∑ is the total number of G, N, P, and J 
votes per case. 
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Cases Granted in the 
1984 Term WB WJB BRW TM HAB LFP WHR JPS SOC ∑ 
W. Air Lines v. Criswell, 
472 U.S. 400 (1985) G  G  G  G  J 5 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 
402 (1985) N  N N N N N N N 8 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985) 
G  J  J  G  G 5 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986)  G G  G G  G  5 
Thornburgh v. Am. College 
of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
(1986) 
P  P    P  P 4 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 747 U.S. 
254 (1986) G  G    G  G 4 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 
U.S. 503 (1986) G  G  G G   G 5 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 
109 (1986) N N N N N  N N N 8 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) J  G   J G  G 5 
City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) N  N   N N N  5 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412 (1986) G  G  J  G  G 5 
Philadelphia Newspapers v. 
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)   N P N N  N N 6 
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 
28 (1986)  G  G G   G G 5 
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Cases Granted in the 
1985 Term WB WJB BRW TM HAB LFP WHR JPS SOC ∑ 
Press-Enterprise v. Super. 
Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986)  G G G J     4 
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Int’l. Ass’n. v. 
E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421 
(1986) 
G  G   G G   4 
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675 (1986) G   
 
 J G G  G 5 
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 
U.S. 162 (1986) G  G 
 
 G G G G G 7 
Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)  G G 
 
 G G G G G 7 
Local 93, Int’l. Ass’n. of 
Firefighters v. Cleveland, 
478 U.S. 501 (1986) 
G  G    G G  G 5 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986) G  G G   G   4 
Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 
U.S. 697 (1986) G     G G  J 4 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714 (1986) N N N N N N N N N 9 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399 (1986)  G  G  G   G 4 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 
137 (1987)  G J G    G  4 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279 (1987)  G  G G   G  4 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157 (1986) G  G  G  G  G 5 
Tashjian v. Republican 
Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) N N N N  N N N N 8 
United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149 (1987) J  G 
 
   G  G 4 
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 
480 U.S. 616 (1987) G  G 
 
   G  G 4 
First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. County 
of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
N N N N N N N N N 9 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 
U.S. 578 (1987) N  N 
 
  N N  N 5 
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Cases Granted in the 
1986 Term WHR WJB BRW TM HAB LP JPS SOC AS ∑ 
United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739 (1987) G G G  G G G G G 8 
Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 
574 (1987)  N  N N  N   4 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm., 483 U.S. 825 (1987) N  N   N  N N 5 
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496 (1987)  G  G G  G   4 
California v. Greenwood, 
486 U.S. 35 (1988) G  G  J G  G  5 
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 
485 U.S. 1 (1988) P  P   P N P P 6 
Lyng v. Nw. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 
485 U.S. 439 (1988) 
G  G   G G G  5 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46 (1988)  G G  G G G   5 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 
592 (1988) G  G   G   G 4 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) G G G G  G  G  6 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815 (1988) J G J G J G G G  8 
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Cases Granted in the 
1987 Term WHR WJB BRW TM HAB JPS SOC AS AMK ∑ 
N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. 
City of New York, 487 U.S. 
1 (1988) 
N  N    N N  4 
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
474 (1988) P P P P P  P P  7 
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 
U.S. 589 (1988) N N N N  N  N  6 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654 (1988) N N N N N N N N  8 
Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656 (1989) 
G G G G G  G G G 8 
Patterson v. McClean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)  G G G  G    4 
DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189 (1989) 
 G G G J     4 
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. 
Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989)  G G G G G    5 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
491 U.S. 110 (1989)  N N  J  J  N 5 
City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989) 
N N N N J N N N N 9 
Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989) 
G G G G G  J  G 7 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas 
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) G  J    G G G 5 
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) N N  N N N N N N 8 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) G  G    G G G 5 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Executives Ass’n., 489 U.S. 
602 (1989) 
G G G G G G G G G 9 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
755 (1989) G  G G G G G G G 8 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302 (1989) G G  G G G G G G 8 
Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361 (1989) G G G G G G G G G 9 
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Cases Granted in the 
1988 Term WHR WJB BRW TM HAB JPS SOC AS AMK ∑ 
The Florida Star v. BJF, 
491 U.S. 524 (1989) N N N N P  P N N 8 
Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of 
Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 
829 (1989) 
N  N    N N N 5 
County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989) 
G  G     G G 4 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361 (1989)   G G G G    4 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989) G  G    G G G 5 
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., 
Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 
(1989) 
N N N N N N N N N 9 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of 
Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 
Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) 
G  G  G  G G  5 
Webster v. Reprod. Health 
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) N  N   N N N N 6 
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 
502 (1990) 
N  N    N N N 5 
Spallone v. United States, 
493 U.S. 265 (1990) G  G    G G G 5 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 417 (1990) G G G G G G G  G 8 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 
U.S. 33 (1990) G G G G  G  G  6 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990) G  J   G G G  5 
United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 
(1990) 
G G G G G G G G G 9 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries 
v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 
U.S. 378 (1990) 
N    N N N N N 6 
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 
(1990) 
    G G  G G 4 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990) 
N N N N N N N  N 8 
Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 
496 U.S. 226 (1990) J  G  J G G  G 6 
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Cases Granted in the  
1988 Term (continued) WHR WJB BRW TM HAB JPS SOC AS AMK ∑ 
Holland v. Illinois, 493 
U.S. 474 (1990) G G G G G G G G G 9 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 








Cases Granted in the  
1989 Term WHR WJB BRW TM HAB JPS SOC AS AMK ∑ 
Rutan v. Republican Party 
of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990)  G G G G G G  G 7 
Mich. Dep’t of State Police 
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) G  G  G  G   4 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 
U.S. 582 (1990) G  G  J  G  G 5 
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547 (1990) G G G G G G G G G 9 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) G  G     G G 4 
Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 
U.S. 279 (1991) G G G G J  G  G 7 
Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 
U.S. 237 (1991) G  G  G  G   4 
UAW v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)   G  J G G G  5 
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)  J G  J  G G G 6 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173 (1991) G G G J G G G G G 9 
United States v. Eichman, 
496 U.S. 310 (1990) N  N    N N N 5 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 
U.S. 146 (1990)  G G G G G G   6 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400 (1991) G  G G G G G G G 8 
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Cases Granted in the  
1990 Term WHR BRW TM HAB JPS SOC AS AMK DS ∑ 
Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 
(1991) 
G G J G  G G G  7 
Masson v. New Yorker 
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 
496 (1991) 
G   G G G G G  6 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) G G  G  G G G  6 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452 (1991) G G J G   G G G 7 
Cohen v. Cowles Media 
Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) G G  J   G   4 
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 
U.S. 380 (1991) G G G G G G  G G 8 
Metro. Wash. Airports 
Auth. v. Citizens for the 
Abatement of Aircraft 
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 
(1991) 
G G G G G G G G G 9 
Franklin v. Gwinnett 
County Pub. Schs., 503 
U.S. 60 (1992) 
 G G  G G    4 
Bray v. Alexandria 
Women’s Health Clinic, 
506 U.S. 263 (1993) 
G G     G G  4 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577 (1992) G G     G G G 5 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 
U.S. 191 (1992) G G  J  G G G G 7 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) 
G G  G G G    5 
United States v. Fordice, 
505 U.S. 717 (1992) G G J G G G G G G 9 
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 
467 (1992) G G    G G G G 6 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808 (1991) G G    G G G G 6 
RAV v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377 (1992)  G J  G     3 
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Cases Granted in the  
1991 Term WHR BRW HAB JPS SOC AS AMK DS CT ∑ 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 
U.S. 1 (1992)  G J G J  G J  6 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992) 
G G J  G G   G 6 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U.S. 428 (1992)  G  G  G  J G 5 
New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) G    G G G G G 6 
United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. 655 
(1992) 
G G G G G G G G G 9 
Nixon v. United States, 506 
U.S. 224 (1993)  G    G G G G 5 
Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992) 
 G G G  G G G G 7 
Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993) 
   G J G G  G 5 
Withrow v. Williams, 507 
U.S. 680 (1993) G    J G J  G 5 
Alexander v. United States, 
509 U.S. 544 (1993)  J G G J  G G  6 
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Cases Granted in the  
1992 Term WHR BRW HAB JPS SOC AS AMK DS CT ∑ 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) 
G G J  G G    5 
Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 
U.S. 1 (1993) 
G G  G   J  G 5 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) 
G G G G G G G G G 9 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. 
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 
(1993) 
G G G G G G G G G 9 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630 (1993) N N N N N N N N N 9 
TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 
U.S. 443 (1993) 
 G J  G   G  4 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 
U.S. 476 (1993) G G G G G G G G G 9 
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) G G    G  J  4 
Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) G G G G G G G G G 9 
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. 
v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 
(1994) 
 G G G J     4 
Rivers v. Roadway Exp., 
Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994) G G G G G G G G G 9 
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17 (1993)  G J G G     4 
United States v. James 
Daniel Good Real Prop., 
510 U.S. 43 (1993) 
G  G G G G G G G 8 
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 
127 (1994)  G J G J G G G  7 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
(1994) 
J G G G G G  J  7 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 
U.S. 661 (1994) G G      G G 4 
Austin v. United States, 509 
U.S. 602 (1993)  G   G   G J 4 
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Cases Granted in the  
1993 Term WHR HAB JPS SOC AS AMK DS CT RBG ∑ 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) N N N N N N N N N 9 
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 
462 (1994) G G G G G G G G G 9 
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel 
Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 
512 U.S. 687 (1994) 
G    G G  G  4 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374 (1994) G   J G G  G  5 
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 
512 U.S. 415 (1994)  J G G     G 4 
Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Ctr., Inc., 
512 U.S. 753 (1994) 
G G G G G G G G G 9 
United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) G G G G G G G G G 9 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 
(1995) 
G G G G  G G G  7 
United States v. Nat’l 
Treasury Employees 
Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) 
G G G G G G G G G 9 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) G G   G  G G G 6 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 
(1995) 
G G  G G G G G G 8 
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APPENDIX B 
Average Rate of Agreement in Votes on the Merits,** Certiorari in All 
Cases Granted, and Certiorari in High-Profile Cases 
 
















































































































































































































































                                                          
 ** Merits agreement rates are from the Harvard Law Review’s statistical recaps of the Supreme 
Court Terms, which can be found in the first issue of each of Volumes 98–108. 
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Pairing Merits Avg. 
Ordinal 
Rank 
Cert 
Avg. 
(All 
Cases)
Ordinal 
Rank 
High-
Profile 
Avg. 
Ordinal 
Rank 
Difference 
Between 
H-P Avg. 
and All 
Cert Avg. 
 
Marshall + 
Kennedy 
 
51.2% 
 
66 
 
47.2% 
 
65 
 
63.6% 
 
33 
 
6.0% 
 
Marshall + 
O’Connor 
 
50.6% 
 
67 
 
44.6% 
 
69 
 
50.1% 
 
57 
 
2.9% 
 
Burger + 
Marshall 
 
49.4% 
 
68 
 
42.5% 
 
70 
 
45.6% 
 
63 
 
1.0% 
 
Blackmun + 
Scalia 
 
49.2% 
 
69 
 
54.1% 
 
51 
 
33.6% 
 
75 
 
-8.9% 
 
Stevens + 
Scalia 
 
48.9% 
 
70 
 
49.1% 
 
61 
 
48.6% 
 
60 
 
-5.5% 
 
Rehnquist + 
Brennan 
 
48.0% 
 
71 
 
40.6% 
 
75 
 
47.4% 
 
62 
 
-1.7% 
 
Brennan + 
Scalia 
 
47.5% 
 
72 
 
45.6% 
 
68 
 
36.0% 
 
74 
 
-4.6% 
 
Rehnquist + 
Marshall 
 
45.6% 
 
73 
 
42.3% 
 
71 
 
40.9% 
 
70 
 
-4.7% 
 
Marshall + 
Scalia 
 
45.0% 
 
74 
 
46.5% 
 
66 
 
38.2% 
 
72 
 
-4.1% 
 
Blackmun + 
Thomas 
 
44.4% 
 
75 
 
57.5% 
 
45 
 
49.9% 
 
58 
 
-7.6% 
 
Stevens + 
Thomas 
 
42.3% 
 
76 
 
56.2% 
 
49 
 
53.1% 
 
54 
 
-3.1% 
 
 
